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Overcoming Neoliberal Hegemony
in Community Development: Law,
Planning, and Selected Lamarckism
Jerrold A. Long*
I. Introduction
THIS ARTICLE IS AN ATTEMPT TO REMEDY PROBLEMS in the legal aspects of
the American planning law system by addressing problems with the
planning aspects. In that sense, it is something of a supply-side ap-
proach to legal evolution, recognizing that while planning cannot
force legal change to occur, it can provide the resources that will
allow it to occur. My core assumption is that land-use planning exists
primarily to justify and legitimate the law that follows. Legitimate law
emerges from the visions and desires of the affected community. But
what if the law that creates our communities and regulates our land is
not connected to the community visions and activities that imagine
them? If land use law does not emerge from those visions, where
does it come from?
Two historical "accidents"-one in law and one in planning-have
created a broken pathway between community visions and formal
legal regimes. The planning accident is perhaps less obvious, or
even certain, and certainly less simple. Over the past few decades, pro-
fessional planning has transitioned from a rational, expert, modernist
planner paradigm to a collaborative planning paradigm.' While this
transition is warranted, it is not without its complexities. The transition
occurred at the same time as two broader cultural shifts that signifi-
cantly reduce the usefulness of the idealized collaborative approach.
*Jerrold A. Long is an Associate Professor of Law and an Affiliate Professor in the
Bioregional Planning and Community Design and Water Resources programs at the
University of Idaho. He earned a J.D. from the University of Colorado-Boulder in
2000 and a Ph.D. in Environment and Resources from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in 2008. He presented an earlier version of this article at the 2011 Annual
Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
1. The contemporary planning paradigm is referred to interchangeably as "colla-
borative" or "communicative." This distinction is meaningful, but will not be addressed
in detail in this article.
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American Bar Association. 
First, the transition to a collaborative paradigm occurred at the same
time as a general overall reduction in social involvement in the
United States.2 Thus, a planning paradigm that relies on social invol-
vement emerged at a time of limited social engagement. But more im-
portant, the collaborative paradigm must interact with an increasingly
entrenched neoliberal orthodoxy that permeates contemporary Ameri-
can culture, economy, and government. 3
The accident in law is much older and more apparent. The nation's
original model land use law contemplated land use decisions "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan."' The failure to define "compre-
hensive plan" in the State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), and the deci-
sion to describe other types of plans in the later model planning act,
created enough confusion among courts that land-use plans have lar-
gely been stripped of their legal significance.' For most contemporary
courts, comprehensive land-use plans are mere guides with little legal
significance.
Those accidents are problematic. To earn and retain legitimacy, the
law must reflect the settled deliberations---even if only temporarily
settled-of a community regarding a specific problem or context.
And that community must be defined inclusively, allowing all sub-
communities to participate in deliberations for a place, even those
that are not favored in the market economy or otherwise do not occupy
the positions of economic or social power that are preferred in market-
based neoliberal government. Community visions must create commu-
nity law. And community visions must emerge from the best ideas of
the entire community, even-and especially-when portions of the com-
munity are structurally or functionally unable to participate in the vision-
creating exercise. Partial exclusive visions that only weakly influence
law do not and cannot justify legal regimes.
This work approaches the disconnect between community visions
and on-the-ground law from the perspective of a person interested in
2. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (showing how Americans are increasingly non-joiners
and that membership in civic and other groups has fallen).
3. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERAUSM (2005) (describ-
ing and criticizing the rise of market-oriented approaches to governance that generally
seek to eliminate "constraints"-including social or environmental regulation-on the
market's functioning).
4. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Act § 3 (1926).
5. See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 1154 (1955); see also Jerrold A. Long, Realizing the Abstraction: Using Today's
Law to Reach Tomorrow's Sustainability, 46 IDAHO L. REv. 341, 360-64 (2010).
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creating, improving, and effectively implementing law. My goal is to
identify a system of connecting community visions to legal regimes
that might realize those visions. While I try to engage directly with
planners, and communicate in their language, I write as a lawyer who
wants to be able to use community plans in a meaningful way. But
there are two impediments. First, the fact that a vision might emerge
from a collaborative-planning exercise does not necessarily mean that
the vision emerges from the community, and thus might not be the
best future available to the community at that particular time. The com-
munity cannot select the best alternative if it is not aware of the full
range of alternatives available to it. And second, even assuming the
community could identify the best available alternative at a particular
place and time, no effective mechanism exists to ensure that the alter-
native is realized, both legally and ultimately on the ground.6
A good community plan is a public good, intended and designed to
benefit as much of the community as it can, and not merely a powerful
subset of the community. But public goods do not enjoy the same ben-
efactors as the private goods that are promoted in public forums. Pub-
lic goods need public benefactors. When those public goods include a
particular vision for a community, they need someone or something to
create, promote, or even require the implementation of land-use ap-
proaches that might effect that vision, but which might not emerge
from a neoliberal visioning and comprehensive planning process that
emphasizes and implements private benefits. Planning must be purpo-
seful. If the giraffe "wants" a long neck, it needs to lengthen its neck.7
If planning wants to be anything more than an exercise in justifying
6. See Long, supra note 5; Edward J. Sullivan & Matthew J. Michel, Ramapo Plus
Thirty: The Changing Role of the Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 URB. LAW. 75, 86
(2003); Edward J. Sullivan & Lawrence Kressel, Twenty Years After: Renewed Signif-
icance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1975); Edward J.
Sullivan, Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law: Comprehen-
sive Planning, 36 URa. LAW. 541 (2004); Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in
Comprehensive Planning Law, 41 URB. LAW. 547 (2009).
7. Lamarck's basic argument was that an animal could "force" evolution by using
and strengthening, or not using and weakening, a particular organ. The classic exam-
ple used to explain the concept of use and disuse is the elongated neck of the giraffe.
According to Lamarck's theory, a given giraffe could, over a lifetime of straining to
reach high branches, develop an elongated neck. A major downfall of his theory was
that he could not explain how this might happen, though he discussed a "natural ten-
dency toward perfection." Another example Lamarck used was the toes of water birds.
He proposed that from years of straining their toes to swim through water, these birds
gained elongated, webbed toes to better their swimming. These two examples demon-
strate how use could change a trait. By the same token, Lamarck believed that disuse
would cause a trait to become reduced. The wings of penguins, for example, would be
smaller than those of other birds because penguins do not use them to fly.
the status quo and confirming the power of entrenched property inter-
ests, it must transition from an emphasis on letting visions emerge
from the community to doing. Local governments, and planners,
must identify good places to go and then tell us how to get there.
Even force us to get there, at least initially. It could be that good
plans, good legal regimes, and ultimately good landscapes, must be
forced on communities, which can then accept or reject them as
they see fit. But they must have that opportunity.
The basic purpose of the planning law system is to enact community
visions on the ground through the parcel-by-parcel creation of a
community's built environment. The system contains two distinct
components-in fact, two distinct purposes-that are explicit in my
characterization of the system as one of "planning law." The planning
purpose is concerned with place-making, "promoting and producing
particular qualities of places, with the aim of promoting broader so-
cial, economic and environmental objectives."8 The law's somewhat
more specific purpose is to make context-specific allocations of rights
and responsibilities, "regulating private land use rights in the 'public
interest' and managing conflicts over the use and development of
land."9 The system only functions well when the two components
are explicitly linked and can work together: plans must recognize
legal constraints and opportunities, and law must recognize that it is
the plan's statement of community purpose that legitimates law and
its ultimate on-the-ground allocations of rights and responsibilities.
Planning that ignores its implementation regime is useless; law that
ignores its purpose is meaningless.
If community plans (of any type) are to provide both legitimacy and
useable guidance for on-the-ground law, they must be able to balance
two competing interests: inclusion and specificity. Legitimate law
must approximate community consensus, and reduce oppressive out-
comes, as much as local contexts and conflicts allow. But because
true consensus on real problems is impossible, consensus-based plan-
ning approaches often leave the difficult problems to the lawmakers,
avoiding specificity in the plan and reducing its capacity to guide
legal choices effectively. This consensus-based vagueness limits the
community's direct influence on the plan's final outcome-the com-
munity's built environment. Assuming this is a problem, the solution
8. Patsy Healey, Collaborative Planning In a Stakeholder Society, 69 TOWN PLAN.
REv. 1, 6 (1998).
9. Id.
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is to identify a planning approach that both takes advantage of the ex-
perience and expertise of rational, technocratic, expert planners, while
at the same time ensuring the participation of all aspects of the com-
munity. The outcome should be a specific, inclusive plan that identifies
the best future available to a particular community and provides strict
and clear guidance to subsequent legal choices.
This article identifies an approach to land-use planning that will
better facilitate the on-the-ground realization of community purpose
as expressed in community plans. The primary focus is on planning,
although both law and planning need to evolve. The story proceeds in
four parts. After an initial discussion of planning's cultural context,
the article describes the structure and limitations of contemporary
law and planning processes, respectively.' 0 Law fails to implement
whatever plans communities provide. And planning fails to provide
something useful for law to implement. The final proposal identifies
a planning approach that might provide planning products better cap-
able of implementing real community visions through and with the
law." My argument combines modernist and post-modernist plan-
ning techniques in a collaborative-expert paradigm I have character-
ized as "selected Lamarckism."l 2 It is Lamarckianl 3 because it relies
on a "forcing" of specific plans on a community by expert planners,
however that community chooses to define both "expert" and "plan-
ners"; it is "selected" because the community retains the capacity to
both accept or reject the forced plans and participate in the creation
of its own plan.
But before continuing the story, I must establish the context of the
discussion. Both law and planning exist in a broader political and cul-
tural context. While we do not have to accept that context as a given, it
does affect both the causes of, and solutions to, any of the problems I
might identify.
10. See infra pp. 17-26.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. "Lamarckian" evolution-as a theory of biological evolution-argues that ani-
mal species respond to gradual environmental change by altering their behaviors to
accommodate or adapt to that change. Those altered behaviors have physiological
consequences-i.e., the animal's physical structure changes as it increases or de-
creases the use of particular organs-that better suit the animal to survive in the
new conditions. It is this specific, "intentional" response to changed environmental
conditions that I analogize to in this article. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE
OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 177-79 (2002).
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II. Planning, Law and the Neoliberal State
Two basic concepts are integral to understanding the need for and
functioning of a selected Lamarckism approach to community plan-
ning. First is the concept of a public good, which I assume is the
good a community plan intends to provide. Second is a neoliberal he-
gemony that largely prevents a community from identifying and
achieving that public good.
This article assumes a specific type of public good: the idea or vision
of the "best" community future at a given point and in a given place.
The specific future at issue is the community's built environment,
which necessarily influences all other aspects of that community. 14
There are entities that profit from the development of land, and profit
more from particular patterns of development than from others. To-
gether, these entities form the "growth machine" of a given commu-
nity.1" Depending on the political and cultural structure of a particular
community, the vision offered by the growth machine might be the
same vision that would be accepted by that community, even if all plau-
sible alternatives were offered and all community members provided an
equal voice in the process. The problem is not that the growth machine
is incapable of offering what might be the best vision; the problem is
rather that both basic microeconomic principles and a neoliberal hege-
mony ensure that the growth machine's vision is the only vision consid-
ered and accepted by local government. Alternative visions, which as
public goods provide no profit maximizing potential for the private
firms that play the largest role in the neoliberal community, are not of-
fered for consideration and will never be adopted, even if they provide
the best alternative for that particular community.
A. Community Plans as Public Goods
The idealized market economy assumes that market actors behave in
specific ways. The market itself is a setting where firms or individuals
14. A variety of works from multiple academic disciplines have discussed the ef-
fect of the built environment on social, cultural, and even family conditions. See
JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CIEs (1961); Tama Leventhal
and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Neighborhoods They Live In: The Effects of Neighbor-
hood Residence on Child and Adolescent Outcomes, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2000);
PETER MARCUSE ET AL., SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CrrY: DEBATES IN URBAN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2009); DOLORES HAYDEN, REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE FUTURE
OF HOUSING, WORK AND FAMILY LIFE 225 (2002); Dan Koeppel, Invisible Riders: For
LA.'s Immigrant Day Laborers, Biking Isn't Exercise or a Hobby. It's a Way to
Get to Work-If There's Work To Be Found, UTNE, July/Aug. 2006, at 50.
15. See Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Econ-
omy of Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1976).
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interact to exchange goods and services at known prices or rates of ex-
change.16 Those firms and individuals act "rationally:" they will make
those market choices that maximize their utility as determined by their
own preferences.' 7 Of course, all market actors have limited resources
to contribute to maximizing utility, so those resources are allocated
based on the marginal utility achieved by allocating a given unit of re-
sources to each potential good or service, compared to the marginal
utility of allocating it to another good or service.' 8
In the present context-community planning-the resources that
must be allocated depend on the specific market actor. Consider the
following simplified example of two potential participants in a colla-
borative planning process: the generic interested citizen who is acting
out of a general concern for the community (rather than in response to
a specific proposal),19 and a developer interested in developing a spe-
cific parcel of land. The types of resources each participant allocates
differs in minor but important respects. The interested citizen largely
allocates personal time. Prospective land developers also allocate time,
as well as money, land, and, potentially, goodwill. More important, the
opportunity costs for each participant vary substantially. The interested
citizen likely forgoes time with family, work, or recreation in order to
attend the public meetings or other activities associated with the plan-
ning process. The land developer, as an individual rather than a firm,
similarly allocates time to attend the meetings, but that time likely
comes from personal time already allocated to "work" rather than "lei-
sure." If we consider the developer as a firm, rather than an individual,
there is no leisure time to allocate. In other words, for the developer, the
time allocated is part of the cost of "doing business"-it is taken from
time allocated to other work duties, if from anywhere.
On the utility side, the land developer and the interested citizen dif-
fer even more sharply. For the land developer, a beneficial outcome is
directly related to increased profits. Particularly where the land devel-
oper owns a specific parcel of land, the prospective benefits of various
alternatives might vary widely, and the developer can measure the
benefit to be received with some concreteness and specificity. But
16. ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECO-
NoMIc THEORY 17 (1995).
17. EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICs 64 (10th ed. 2000).
18. Id. at 81-86.
19. If it is hard to imagine a citizen participating in the time-consuming and thank-
less comprehensive planning process solely out of an altruistic concern for the greater
good, that is understandable, as I will explain below.
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for the interested citizen, the utility obtained for engaging in the process
is both less certain and less specific, particularly in the early stages of
the planning process. The difference between medium-density residen-
tial and low-density residential as a general and vague planning de-
scription on a hypothetical parcel of land might not mean much to a
typical citizen, but it could mean a significant difference in final profits
for the person seeking to develop those parcels. For the average citi-
zen, therefore, the opportunity cost for participating might be high,
with the potential benefit relatively low. For the land developer, the
opportunity costs are relatively lower (they are simply part of the
job), but the potential benefits are much higher.
This simplistic hypothetical benefit-cost comparison suggests that
certain types of community plans are unlikely to emerge from a colla-
borative planning process. So long as market actors behave "ration-
ally," the market will remain incapable of allocating resources to ef-
fectively provide public goods.2 0 Communities ideally do not engage
in the planning process to benefit specific individuals, but rather to ben-
efit the entire community as a single entity. The citizen, and commu-
nity generally, is seeking a public benefit: a good community, or a nice
place to live. In the language of one recently-adopted comprehensive
plan, a comprehensive plan must "promote ... the spirit of the people,
wildlife, and land entrusted to its care." 21 The hypothetical developer,
in contrast, is seeking a private benefit: increased profits for her firm.
Promoting or protecting the "spirit of the people, wildlife, and land" is
a benefit that the citizens together can imagine, but these things do not
provide the specific, identifiable, and obvious utility that the develo-
per's private benefits provide.
In the abstract then, a community plan is a "public good"-a good
that is unlikely to be provided by private firms acting in a market econ-
omy. A public good has two characteristics that reduce its marginal
utility when considered by a potential market provider.22 Pure public
goods are nonrival: "the marginal cost of providing the good to [an-
other] consumer is zero."23 In other words, the consumption of a
public good by one consumer does not diminish the capacity of any
20. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (ex-
plaining the logic of collective action); see also MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17,
at 20.
21. KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, ch.1, § 4 (2010) [hereinafter
KCCP], available at http://www.kcgov.us/departments/planning/newcompplan.asp.
22. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, 609-10.
23. Id. at 610.
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number of additional consumers to enjoy the public good in equal
measure. This could be an extremely useful characteristic, given that
a firm could reach additional consumers without increasing costs,
but public goods are also nonexclusive.2 4 The producer of the public
good cannot easily or costlessly exclude additional people from con-
suming the good. Once the good is created and provided to one person,
it is functionally impossible to prevent all other consumers from simi-
larly enjoying the benefits the goods provide. A classic, if not perfect,
example of a public good is the lighthouse built to guide maritime tra-
velers.25 The use of the lighthouse by one traveler does not diminish
the ability of another to use it, nor can any traveler be excluded
from taking advantage of its guidance. 26
If providing a public good to any single consumer necessarily pro-
vides it to every other consumer, there is little to no incentive for the
private provision of the public good. 27 As noted above, neoclassical
economics generally assumes that a firm's primary objective is to
maximize profits.28 Because the free-rider problem associated with
public goods eliminates most of the profit maximization potential in
the private provision of public goods, those public goods will not be
provided by private firms. 29 Instead, at least theoretically, it generally
falls on the government to provide those public goods.30
This is not to say that private actors do not voluntarily provide pub-
lic goods in any circumstance. A significant body of literature exists
providing examples of the private provision of public goods and at-
tempting to document the conditions under which that provision will
occur.3 1 And many local governments rely on voluntary citizen contri-
butions to local boards, including not insignificantly for our purposes
24. Id.
25. See JOHN STUART MILL, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 968 (2006).
26. See id. But see Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN.
357 (1974) (disagreeing that the lighthouse is in fact a pure public good, based in part
on a British tradition of imposing a toll on ships that passed a lighthouse).
27. MAS-COLELL, supra note 16, at 361-63.
28. Id. at 135; MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 191.
29. MAS-COLELL, supra note 16, at 361-63; MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at
610-12.
30. This is inherent in the basic concept of public goods and was Mill's primary
point: "[Ilt is a proper office of government to build and maintain lighthouses ...
for since it is impossible that the ships at sea which are benefitted by a lighthouse,
should be made to pay a toll on the occasion of its use, no one would build lighthouse
from motives of personal interest. . . ." MILL, supra note 25, at 968.
31. See, e.g., Theordore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume and Hal Varian, On the Pri-
vate Provision of Public Goods, 29 J. PUB. EcoN. 25 (1986); James Andreoni, Impure
Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100
EcON. J. 464 (1990); R. Mark Issac, James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams,
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here, local planning boards.32 But even if they are "voluntary," the com-
position of those planning boards still reflects the basic public goods
problem, and differential private benefits: local planning boards consist
largely of members of the locality's growth machine, those individuals
who stand to benefit personally from growth and development.33
In the community planning context, where the participants are pri-
marily landowners or others who benefit from the use and develop-
ment of land, there is little incentive by the most active participants
to promote outcomes that might benefit the larger community. 34 As
Mancur Olson argued over four decades ago: "If the members of a
large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they
will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there
is coercion to force them to do so. . . .."3 Unfortunately, the long-
range nature of comprehensive plans effectively creates a "game"
with a finite number of rounds; the game ends once the plan is adopted,
at least for that generation. Theoretically, participants contribute zero in
the final round, as well as all preceding rounds, of any game participants
know to be finite. 36 Experimentally, while contributions are not zero in
games with finite rounds, contributions decrease in each succeeding
round, until over 70% of participants contribute zero in the announced
final round. 37 While Elinor Ostrom, among many others, have demon-
strated that groups are capable of cooperating to achieve public goods,
a key component of that increased cooperation is face-to-face commu-
nication.38 This suggests that as the size of a group or its geographic or
Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Uti-
lizing Large Groups, 54 J. Pus. EcoN. 1 (1994).
32. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Brudney, Volunteer Involvement in the Delivery of Public
Servicers: Advantages and Disadvantages, 16 PuB. PROD. & MGMT. REv. 283 (1993).
33. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the Wheel Unbalanced? A Study
of Bias on Zoning Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447 (2004); Jerry L. Anderson, Aaron Brees
& Emily C. Renninger, A Study of American Zoning Board Composition and Public
Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689 (2008). My own experience demon-
strates this in a slightly different way. I am a volunteer on my community's Board of
Adjustment, which hears a variety of land-use applications. While I would like to claim
that my behavior is altruistic, the reality is that I perceived serving on this particular
board as something that would benefit me in my profession. I was seeking to maximize
personal utility.
34. See Molotch, supra note 15; see also Harvey Molotch, The Political Economy
of Growth Machines, 15 J. URB. AFF. 29 (1993) (examining the links between growth
machine politics and environmental impacts and movements).
35. OLsoN, supra note 20, at 2.
36. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J.
EcoN. PERSP. 137, 139 (2000).
37. Id. at 140.
38. See Elinor Ostrom & James Walker, Neither Markets nor States: Linking
Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas, POLYCENTRIc GAMES AND INSTI-
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cultural diversity increases, cooperation is likely to decline, yielding
outcomes that more closely match Olson's original argument about in-
dividual rationality and public goods.39 Even a small town contains
potentially thousands of different land owners with different goals
and interests.
B. Community Plans and Neoliberal Governance
The public goods problem is not insurmountable, but it is inherent in
any individual's resource allocation decisions. But perhaps more sig-
nificant is how this public goods problem works itself out in the con-
text of contemporary governance, which is increasingly overwhelmed
by a neoliberal hegemony that takes the fundamental position that
government is not in the business of providing public goods.40 Neoli-
beralism refers to the use of orthodox neoclassical economics as the
guiding principle in government, and even social and cultural relation-
ships; the role of the state is to ensure the unfettered function of pri-
vate markets:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual en-
trepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 41
As University of Chicago Professor John Comaroff explains, para-
phrasing and agreeing with Michel Foucault,4 2 the guiding principle of
modern government is now the market economy; government has
itself become business, treating the governed as shareholders with
profit maximization as the overriding goal of governance. 4 3 Economic
tutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 427
(2000); Ostrom, supra note 36; see also ROBERT C. ELUCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
39. Ostrom, supra note 36.
40. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); Loic WAC-
QUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009);
Suzan Ilcan, Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Gov-
ernment, 46 CAN. REV. Soc. 207 (2009); Terris Milton, The Neoliberal Triad of Anti-
Health Reforms: Government Budget Cutting, Deregulation, and Privatization, 20 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 149 (1999).
41. HARVEY, supra note 40, at 2.
42. In 1978-1979, Michel Foucault's public lectures at the Coll&ge de France-The
Birth ofBiopolitics-addressed the rise of neoliberalism, or the emerging tendency of
governments to use the market economy as the guiding principle in governance. Those
lectures were published in MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLYTICS: LECTURES AT
THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1978-1979 (2008).
43. See John Comaroff, The End of Neoliberalism? : What is Left of the Left, 637
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141, 144-45 (2011).
355
growth, rather than any particular philosophical imperative (e.g., life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), becomes both the mission and
legitimator of the State.' Perhaps more significant, Chicago School
neo-liberalism extends beyond what might have been characterized
as the traditional "economy" to include "all forms of human action
and behaviour." 45
The shift to neoliberal government has significant effects on the ap-
proach local governments take to land-use regulation. Among core
neoliberal principles are the sanctity of private property and deregula-
tion.46 Land-use planning, and the ultimate reallocations of potential
rights and privileges it entails, necessarily regulates the use of private
lands. The neoliberal government, therefore, fundamentally distrusts
land-use planning. Unfortunately, because of the public goods pro-
blem discussed above, contemporary planning practice-originally in-
tended to facilitate real involvement by all aspects of a community-
serves instead to reinforce and legitimate the neoliberal hegemony
over community planning.
Together, our understanding of the community plan as a public good,
the identities and motivations of the actors in any planning law ecosys-
tem, and the neoliberal influence on government and its understood
"purpose," create the landscape in which land-use visions are created
and communicated, and ultimately, if ineffectively, realized on the
ground through the creation and implementation of formal law. With
this landscape in mind, we can now consider the inadequacies of
both components of the planning law system.
IH. The Formalization of Community
Vision through Law
I have characterized the institutional structure at issue here as a "plan-
ning law" system. Further, I have generally described the system as
operating linearly in a single direction: from blank canvas to imagin-
ings of place, to plans, to law, and finally some realization on the
44. See Thomas Lemke, 'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at
the Collage de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality, 30 ECON. & Soc. 190, 196
(2001).
45. Id. at 198; see also JAMIE PECK & ADAM TICKELL, Conceptualizing Neoliberal-
ism, Thinking Thatcherism, CONTESTING NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN FRONTIERS 26 (2007).
46. Harvey, supra note 40, at 64; see also HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHs IN THE WEST AND FALS EVERYwHERE ELSE (2000) (ar-
guing that the protection of private property is one of the most important roles of the
state).
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ground. This is an oversimplification of an inaccurate model. The
planning law system is not linear, it is chaotic. 4 7 There is no blank can-
vas on which we impose visions of place. Rather, there is a place-
including existing law and other institutions, as well as the conse-
quences of those institutions-that informs our developing visions for
the future of that place. As we imagine our future, we react to what
we did before, where we came from, and our understandings of the
causes of the physical, social, and cultural landscapes we have experi-
enced and are experiencing.
This, of course, is obvious. But if our purpose is to consider care-
fully how visions legitimate law, we must also consider carefully
the context in which those visions emerge. Before considering how
we plan, and its potential effects on law, the following section explains
the legal context in which planning happens.
The key assumption of this article is that some best vision for a
community exists, and that the planning process-including both crea-
tion and implementation-should facilitate achievement of that best vi-
sion. Rather than treating land-use plans as enforceable law, which
would necessarily require that plans contain much more detailed re-
quirements for the nature and structure of community plans, most
American jurisdictions have determined that land-use plans are not
legally enforceable, but rather "guides" of some measure. 4 8 Local gov-
ernments (or other implementing jurisdictions) and courts therefore
are not bound by the exact language of the plan, but are able to freely
interpret the plan in the context of some implementation exercise:
either the establishment of a general zoning code, or the approval of
a specific proposal.
Consequently, in addition to the creation of the plan itself, there are
two decision moments or processes in which neoliberal hegemony in-
fluences the decision and potentially drives the outcome further from
the hypothetical best vision the community might have desired. One of
the critiques of collaborative planning I will present in subsequent sec-
tions is its tendency toward vagueness, which I claim is a necessary out-
come of its collaborative nature. Understanding that many land-use
plans are vague, without specific recommendations or requirements,
helps explain much of the planning law jurisprudence discussed below.
47. See Jerrold A. Long, Private Lands, Conflict, and Institutional Evolution in the
Post-Public-Lands West, 28 PACE ENVTh. L. REv. 670, 726-29 (2011); see also
EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS (1993); JAMEs GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A
NEW SCIENCE (1987).
48. See Sullivan, Ramapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6.
357
The law interacts with planning and intended planning outcomes in
two ways. First, the law reacts to community plans by creating legal
rules to give effect to those plans, and then in implementing those
laws in the day-to-day banality of local government-the original zon-
ing designations or revisions, conditional or special use permits, var-
iances, subdivision approvals, design standards, exactions, planned
unit developments, etc.49 The actual language of the plan should be
crucial at this stage, given the inherent flexibility or discretion allowed
local governments or their planning offices and the constant pressure
from the growth machine to modify pre-established standards.50 A
vague plan increases discretion; a specific plan decreases it.
The second interaction happens during legal appeals, when the nat-
ure and propriety of the first interaction is challenged. While specifi-
city continues to play a role in determining the outcome of this second
interaction, at this point the plan's "creation story" grows in signifi-
cance. The vast majority of states follow a legal approach that pro-
vides little guidance to courts as they consider how land-use plans
and on-the-ground decisions should relate to each other. As Louis
Menand describes, without (and often even with) strict legal standards
for guidance, a court must balance an array of competing impera-
tives. Without overtly preferring any single approach over the
others, judges must consider the value of precedent, the potential for
precedent to be inconsistent with evolving social norms, the need
for justice in the individual case, the potential for a specific decision
to influence future behavior, the need for the decision to conform
49. While it might seem appropriate to separate this first interaction into two sepa-
rate interactions-the creation and then implementation of local law-local land-use
law is much more fluid than that. Zoning designations are subject to constant revision
in response to site-specific applications. Many legal disputes-including claims of
"spot zoning," or the quasi-judicial v. legislative action distinction-reflect this
fluid nature of local land-use law. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW
§§ 6.27-6.33 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing spot zoning); see also Fasano v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (articulating quasi-judicial vs. legislative
distinction).
50. In most states, courts grant substantial discretion to local governing bodies in
their review of the consistency of law or case-by-case decisions with comprehensive
land-use plans. See MANDELKER, supra note 49, at § 3.14 (2003); JULIAN CONRAD JUER-
GENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION
LAW, § 2.13 (2d ed. 2007). Courts generally characterize both the original zoning and
most re-zoning decisions as "legislative" decisions, subject only to arbitrary and capri-
cious review. See, e.g., Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26 (distinguishing between legislative and
quasi-judicial land-use decisions, but recognizing that "the majority of jurisdictions
state that a zoning ordinance is a legislative act and is thereby entitled to presumptive
validity."), distinguished by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980).
51. Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 339 (2001).
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with the judge's own moral and ethical standards, the desire to punish
bad behavior and promote good behavior, and the need to promote
economic efficiency while ensuring that costs are born by those who
can afford to bear them, among other competing imperatives. 52 A
plan that originated in a growth-machine dominated neoliberal process
and which more or less transparently reflects the desires and influence
of the growth machine, provides little opportunity for a court to bal-
ance potentially competing imperatives. If the community is silent
in the planning process, it is equally silent during judicial review.
There is, then, a significant disconnect in both of these intersections
between what a community might imagine-given the opportunity
to do so-and what happens on the ground. This disconnect between
community imaginings and the legal regimes that should result is both
unfortunate and problematic. It is unfortunate because a community-
based, inclusive, and Pragmatic5 3 planning exercise might yield a
community vision of place, based in shared experiences and expecta-
tions, that could serve as a foundation for legal choices and evolving
norms and rules. It is problematic because without that foundation, an
existing legal regime has little to recommend it over other potentially
legitimate or illegitimate alternatives. It becomes arbitrary, at least
from a community perspective.
In most circumstances, arbitrary law cannot last. As we experience
the consequences of previous choices, we compare those consequences
to our previous imaginings to determine if the world we have created is
the world we wanted to create.54 If not, over time, we adapt, adjust, and
proceed accordingly. This process is somewhat complicated in all cir-
cumstances, but it is particularly so with land. Our land use choices
have two consequences that substantially constrain future choices:
they more-or-less permanently alter both the physical and metaphysical
environments in which land-use decisions occur.
Land-use decisions create a durable physical and cultural place. The
consequences of land-use choices are more real than many other legal
52. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACy 59-85
(2003) (articulating principles of pragmatic adjudication).
53. I capitalize "Pragmatic" here to distinguish the philosophical pragmatism to
which I refer from the more common, colloquial understanding of the term. See Dou-
LAS McDERMID, THE VARIETIES OF PRAGMATISM: TRUTH, REALISM, AND KNOWLEDGE FROM
JAMES To RORTY (2006).
54. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 147
(1923); see also DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SuFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM
AND THE MEANING OF EcoNoMIC INsTrruIONs 67-84 (2006). For a detailed discussion
of how this process works in legal decision-making, see POSNER, supra note 52.
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decisions. They create the structure of the places we live, determine
the size of our homes, nature of our commutes and communities,
and the views we enjoy, or not, out our front windows. Only with ex-
treme difficulty are those physical and cultural manifestations of
choice revised or revisited. And rarely are they wholly eliminated.
Land-use decisions also create a metaphysical place that further
constrains future choices. The most durable of American institutions
is our system of property relations, almost exclusively (if inaccurately)
referred to as a system of "property rights." The existence and even the
assertion of property rights in private lands constrain both the legal
and political options available to a community. And land use deci-
sions, including site-specific land use approvals as well as general zon-
ing decisions, create the perception, and at times the reality, of vested
rights to use a particular parcel of land in a particular way. Those po-
litical and legal rights can emerge regardless of the wisdom or legiti-
macy of the specific land-use institution that birthed them. Unwise
choices, even arbitrary choices, can create permanent legal rights.5
But if we assume that law represents-or should represent-the
final blessing we bestow upon our settled deliberations for a place
(or at least for a specific conflict at a precise moment in time), the sug-
gestion that law might not reflect our community visions for a place
should be unsettling. It might also be inaccurate. I suggest that arbi-
trary law-defined as law without some foundation in reason or rea-
sonable ends-cannot last. But "plan-less" land-use regimes do last.
In fact, if experience provides any guide, plan-less land-use regimes
are more durable than any alternative. That fact requires we inquire
into how we justify those regimes, if it is not our reliance on the
visions that might emerge from the community.
In the United States, we understand plans and law as two distinct
structures with separate and distinct legal meanings. Most states are
"plan as guide" states, in which counties and municipalities must con-
sider comprehensive plans during ordinance drafting and considera-
tion of site-specific proposals, but land-use decisions need not strictly
conform to comprehensive plans.56 As the Idaho Supreme Court noted
in its most recent decision directly on point, "A comprehensive plan is
55. See Long, supra note 47 (describing the process one community followed in
creating enough vested rights in subdivision developments to last up to 300 years);
see also Allen Best, The Zombies of Teton County: Unfinished Zombie Housing Devel-
opments Haunt the Rural West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, March 5, 2012.
56. See, e.g., Sullivan, Ramapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6; Charles M. Haar, In
Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154, 1158 (1955).
VOL. 44, No. 2 SPRING 2012
NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
not a legally controlling zoning law, it serves as a guide to local gov-
ernment agencies charged with making zoning decisions. The 'in
accordance with' language . . . does not require zoning decisions to
strictly conform to the land use designations of the comprehensive
plan."57
Most states take approaches similar to Idaho's, in which the plan is
a factor in crafting ordinances or making site-specific decisions, but is
not determinative. Even Washington, which is often characterized as a
state with a stringent planning law requirement, follows the "plan as
guide" approach. While journal articles might characterize Washing-
ton as requiring strict conformity with comprehensive plans,5 the
Washington Supreme Court has a different opinion:
In Barrie v. Kitsap County, we held comprehensive plans generally are not used to
make specific land use decisions. Instead, we stated a comprehensive plan is a
"guide" or "blueprint" to be used when making land use decisions. Although the
court confirmed there need not be "strict adherence" to a comprehensive plan,
any proposed land use decision must generally conform with the comprehensive
plan. 59
In the abstract, this language might allow for a requirement of some
level of strict adherence with a comprehensive plan, but the Washing-
ton court clarified its intentions in the following sentences: "If a com-
prehensive plan prohibits a particular use but the zoning code permits
it, the use would be permitted. These rules require that conflicts be-
tween a general comprehensive plan and a specific zoning code be
resolved in the zoning code's favor."a
Only four states follow the "plan as law" approach, requiring strict
conformance with the comprehensive land-use plan.61 Wisconsin
might be a fifth, as its new "smart growth" law uses language similar
to Washington's, requiring a range of land-use decisions-including
zoning and subdivision approvals-to be "consistent with" the com-
prehensive plan.62 But that requirement has only been in effect since
57. Evans v. Teton Cnty., 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003).
58. Sullivan, Ramapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6, at 86 (characterizing Washington
as a "planning mandate" state: "In Delaware, Florida, Oregon, and Washington, the
comprehensive plan is a legal standard for review of land use decisions[.]").
59. Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 947 P.2d 1208, 1214-15
(1997).
60. Id. at 1215.
61. Those states are California, Delaware, Florida, and Oregon. See Sullivan,
Ramapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6, at 86. But see Long, supra note 47, at 363-64 (dis-
agreeing with Sullivan and Michel's claim that six states follow the plan as law
approach).
62. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.1001(3) (2010).
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Jan. 1, 2010, and the Wisconsin courts have yet to determine the nat-
ure of the consistency required.63 However, given its similarity to the
Washington language, and the general "in accordance with" language
of the standard act, it is not obvious that the "consistent with" lan-
guage will require a significant change in Wisconsin law. Prior to
2010, the Wisconsin position was that "once a comprehensive land
use plan is enacted, the plan is merely advisory. In essence, a compre-
hensive plan is merely a guide to community development."' A re-
cent revision to the law clarified that "'consistent with' means furthers
or does not contradict the objectives, goals, and policies contained in
the comprehensive plan." 65 One commenter suggested this change was
intended to incorporate the Wisconsin Supreme Court's previous un-
derstanding of "consistent with" as articulated in a 1985 case. 66 In
other words, with respect to the legal status of the comprehensive
plan, Wisconsin's new approach likely did not change anything.
So at most, even including Wisconsin, five states require strict com-
pliance with land-use plans. The remaining forty-five states consider
the plan to be a mere guide, with varying levels of influence. A recent
Kansas case illustrates how the plan-as-guide approach limits the capa-
city of community plans to constrain site-specific development propo-
sals. In Manly v. City of Shawnee, the local school district sought per-
mission to construct a lighted softball stadium complex. 67 Although
the zoning ordinance specifically allowed softball fields, the ordinance
required a special use permit for both the lighting and the stadium
seating. A neighboring landowner challenged the city's approval of
the proposal, claiming that the decision violated a Kansas requirement
that local zoning decisions be "reasonable." 68 In Kansas, courts must
presume that land-use decisions by local governments are reasonable,
and the burden is on the challenging landowner to prove unreasonable-
ness by a preponderance of the evidence. 69 Kansas courts may only
find land-use decisions unreasonable when "compelled to do so by
63. Id.
64. Step Now Citizens Grp. v. Town of Utica Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 663 N.
W.2d 833, 845 (Wis. 2003).
65. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.1001(1)(am) (2010).
66. See Brian W. Ohm, Perspectives on Planning: 2010 Updates to Wisconsin's
Comprehensive Planning Lw (May 2010), available at urpl.wisc.edu/research/
2009%20wis%20act%20372%20summary.pdf.
67. Manly v. City of Shawnee, 194 P.3d I (Kan. 2008).
68. Id. at 10-11.
69. Id. at 10 (discussing McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Bd. of Shawnee Cnty.
Comm'rs, 49 P.3d 522 (Kan. 2002)).
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the evidence," and when the action is "so arbitrary that it can be said it
was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the com-
munity at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the
mark that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate."70
There are eight factors courts must consider in assessing the reason-
ableness of a land-use decision, including the decision's conformity
with the locality's master or comprehensive plan.
In reviewing the city's decision regarding the softball complex's
conformity with the Shawnee master plan, the Kansas Supreme
Court did not consider the Shawnee master plan, nor cite to any rele-
vant language of the plan. Perhaps more important, the Kansas Su-
preme Court acknowledged that the district court also did not ex-
pressly consider or explain its analysis of the Shawnee master plan,
noting that "formal findings and conclusions are not mandatory[.]"7 2
But because the district court "had the minutes from the City planning
commission and City Council meetings, the City planning staff re-
ports, the comprehensive plan, and an audiotape of the meetings, at
which there was a great deal of debate on the project's impact on
the surrounding property[," the Manly court found itself "convinced
that the district court applied the appropriate analysis." 3 In uphold-
ing the district court's reasonableness decision, the Manly court sug-
gests that what matters is not whether the evidence demonstrates a par-
ticular decision's actual conformity with a locality's master plan, only
that the evidence demonstrates that the locality considered its master
plan in reaching its decision. Actual conformity with the plan is
largely irrelevant:
[Ilt makes scant sense to complain that the City did not take the comprehensive plan
into account, when the comprehensive plan was specifically mentioned in the mo-
tion to approve the special use permit. Again, the City took the factor into consid-
eration but did not agree with the Manlys' point of view."
70. Id.
71. See id. at 10-11 (citing to Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan.
1978) (listing the eight factors as: (1) the character of the neighborhood; (2) the zoning
uses of nearby properties; (3) the suitability of the property for the uses to which it is
restricted; (4) the extent to which the change will detrimentally affect nearby property;
(5) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned; (6) the gain to the public
health, safety, and welfare by the possible diminution in value of the developer's prop-
erty as compared to the hardship imposed on the individual landowners; (7) the recom-
mendations of a permanent or professional planning staff; and (8) the conformance of
the requested change to the city's master or comprehensive plan.).
72. Manly, 194 P.3d at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Shawnee City Council had in fact considered whether the proposed
softball complex was consistent with the city's comprehensive plan, and apparently
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The point here is not that the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a local
decision that was inconsistent with a comprehensive plan. The point is
that the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a local decision without even
knowing or considering whether it was consistent with the city's com-
prehensive plan. The plan itself played no role in the court's decision.
Kansas is not alone in its lack of respect for comprehensive plans.
As noted above, only four states require strict compliance with land-
use plans. And in fact, many states do not require a land-use plan at
all in a real sense, even in the face of statutory requirements.7 5 In a
classic New York case, Udell v. Haas, the New York Court of Appeals
considered whether a specific rezoning decision satisfied the require-
ment that land-use decisions be made "in accordance with [the] com-
prehensive plan."" The city had not adopted a formal comprehensive
plan, but that did not trouble the court. Instead it noted that "the search
for the village's 'comprehensive plan' is relatively easy. It may be
found in both the village's zoning ordinance and in its zoning
map."77 In other words, in New York, determining whether a zoning or-
dinance is in accordance with a comprehensive plan requires determin-
ing whether the zoning ordinance is in accordance with itself.7 Connec-
ticut follows a similar approach: "In the absence of a formally adopted
comprehensive plan, a town's comprehensive plan is to be found in the
scheme of the zoning regulations themselves." 79 As many as eighteen
determined that because the land was designated "quasi-public," a softball complex
would be appropriate. But because the city's planning and zoning commission had
not considered that specific issue, the city attorney recommended the city include
the following language in its approval: "Further, the Governing Body overrides ...
any portion of the Comprehensive Plan to the contrary to the approval of the special
use permit and [to] the extent necessary, the Comprehensive Plan is deemed to be
amended." Minutes of the City of Shawnee Kansas City Council, Jan. 9, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.cityofshawnee.orgfWEB/MINUTES.NSF/03133cfae4e31fc0862570
dd005fe696/413195b25e8e0ccb86257100004fl8ec?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
25, 2012).
75. In 2003, Sullivan and Michel identified eighteen states that did not require a
distinct comprehensive plan: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. See Sullivan, Ra-
mapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6, at 90.
76. Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968).
77. Id.
78. New York courts continue to accept the basic principle articulated in Udell:
"The amendments at issue in this case are, by their very nature, in accord with the
comprehensive plan manifested in the Zoning Ordinance of the Town of Sardinia ori-
ginally enacted." Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226,
1236 (N.Y. 1996) (emphasis added).
79. Timber Trails Assocs. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 916 A.2d 99, 111
(Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
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states don't require any independent comprehensive plan at all, even in
the face of statutory requirements that land use decisions be made "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan."80
But even if the plan-as-guide (or less) approach remains the predo-
minant understanding of the plan-law relationship, that does not mean
that land-use plans have no capacity to affect local land-use decisions.
Every year, Edward J. Sullivan prepares a document for The Urban
Lawyer assessing "Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning
Law."s" In 2010, Sullivan suggested that courts are gradually moving
away from the plan-as-guide approach toward a more rigorous, de-
manding connection between plans and site-specific decisions: "The
trend continues to shift . . . to a greater judicial respect for the plan
in evaluating zone changes and permits in the land use area[.]" 82
This "trend" does not always reflect a specific new respect for compre-
hensive plans. For example, to demonstrate his trend, Sullivan relies
on one case from Washington that reaffirms the supremacy of zoning
ordinances over conflicting comprehensive plans.83 In Cingular Wire-
less LLC v. Thurston County, a Washington appellate court affirmed a
county's decision to deny a permit based, in part, on requirements con-
tained in the county's comprehensive plan. 84 The court explicitly re-
cognized that where a comprehensive plan and zoning code are in con-
flict, the zoning code will control." But that was not the case here.
The court affirmed the decision based on the comprehensive plan be-
cause the zoning code required consistency with the comprehensive
plan: "where, as here, the zoning code itself expressly requires that
a proposed use comply with a comprehensive plan, the proposed use
must satisfy both the zoning code and the comprehensive plan."86 In
other words, it was the zoning code, rather than the comprehensive
plan, that provided the legal justification for denying the permit.
80. Sullivan, Ramapo Plus Thirty, supra note 6.
81. See Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law,
42 URB. LAW. 665 (2010).
82. Id. at 676.
83. See Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law,
39 URB. LAW. 681, 690 (2007) (citing Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 129
P.3d 300 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)).
84. Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston Cnty., 129 P.3d 300 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
85. Id. at 306.
86. Id. For an alternative interpretation of a similar requirement, see Urrutia v.
Blaine Cnty., 2 P.3d 738 (Id. 1999) (deciding that zoning codes could not require
compliance with a comprehensive plan, as that would-in the Idaho Supreme Court's
opinion-elevate the comprehensive plan to the status of law, which it cannot be).
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But although it is not yet clear if there is indeed a trend toward
greater respect for local land-use plans, there is evidence from unex-
pected sources. In 2010, Sullivan reviewed a Montana Supreme
Court case, Lake County First v. Polson City Council," and character-
ized the Montana approach as requiring "only 'substantial compliance'
of the zoning regulations with the plan, a deferential standard."8 8 But
in contrast with the Kansas approach addressed in Manly, the Montana
Supreme Court's "deferential" approach directly and specifically con-
sidered the requirements of the comprehensive plan and the manner in
which the City of Polson considered those requirements.
At issue in Lake County First was a request by Wal-Mart for the city
to annex a parcel of land, rezone it to "highway commercial," subdi-
vide it, and approve a special use permit authorizing construction of a
Wal-Mart supercenter. 89 Plaintiffs alleged that approval of Wal-Mart's
proposal failed to comply with two provisions of the City of Polson
Master Plan. The plan indicated that the city should not permit "mono-
lithic structures that continuously block views from the highway to the
lake[.]" 90 Unlike the Kansas approach, the Montana court specifically
considered how the city had dealt with this aspect of the comprehen-
sive plan:
Views were a significant issue during the application process and were discussed in
detail by the application and during public meetings. Wal-Mart worked coopera-
tively with the Department and the Board to address the architecture and elevation
of the building to ensure that views would not be hindered. Wal-Mart presented a
computer simulation of the proposed store to illustrate that the store would not rise
above the grade of the hill next to the highway and thus would not obstruct the
views from the highway to the lake.
9 1
The second relevant plan provision concerned the city's central
business district, containing the policy to "avoid excessive commercial
zoning outside the CBD." 92 The Montana Court engaged in an even
more thorough consideration of this issue. Again, rather than simply
accept the city's determination as to whether it has satisfied this ele-
ment of the comprehensive plan, the Montana court considered the
87. 218 P.3d 816 (Mont. 2009).
88. See Sullivan, supra note 81, at 668.
89. Lake Cniy. First, 218 P.3d 816.
90. Id. at 824 (quoting City of Polson Master Plan).
91. Id. According to the "Street View" function available on Google Maps, the
Wal-Mart building does not obstruct views of the lake, and is in fact only partly visi-
ble to travelers on the highway entering Polson from the south.
92. Id. at 825.
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evidence provided, the city's analysis of the evidence, and the appro-
priateness of its conclusions regarding that evidence.9 3 The court
noted that the "issue was a very visible issue throughout the review
process and within the evidentiary record before the Council, includ-
ing the Department Report, the Department Director's public state-
ments, the Plaintiffs' Report, and many public comments." 94
On its own, the Lake County First decision demonstrates a serious
and careful consideration of a local government's treatment of its
comprehensive plan. While the ultimate decision is appropriately de-
ferential to the city, it is not blindly so, and requires that the city ex-
plain in some detail how "substantial compliance" is achieved. A more
recent Montana case reinforces this interpretation of the Montana sub-
stantial compliance approach, suggesting again that it is not as defer-
ential as Sullivan implies. In Heffernan v. Missoula City Council,95 the
Montana Supreme Court considered the City of Missoula's approval
of a thirty-seven-lot subdivision. While it still applied the "substantial
compliance"96 standard that Sullivan characterized as "deferential," 97
the Heffernan court used it to overturn the city's decision, rather than
confirm it.98 The court overturned Missoula's decision notwithstand-
ing the court's recognition of a recently adopted (but as yet, judicially
unexamined) statutory provision that the court had suggested before
could be assumed to have "intended to reduce in some fashion the re-
liance which local governing bodies are required to place upon growth
policies when making land use decisions." 99
At issue in Heffernan was the consistency of the thirty-seven-lot
subdivision with the Rattlesnake Valley Comprehensive Plan, a statu-
torily authorized sub-plan associated with the overall City of Missoula
Growth Policy and Missoula County Growth Policy.' 00 The city and
county worked jointly on the original Rattlesnake Valley plan in
1988, adopting an updated version in 1995. The city and county incor-
porated the 1995 plan into the Missoula County Growth Policy in
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80 (Mont. 2011).
96. Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 100.
97. Sullivan, supra note 81.
98. Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 106.
99. Id. at 101 (quoting Citizen Advocates for a Livable Missoula, Inc. v. City
Council, 130 P.3d 1259 (Mont. 2006)).
100. See Mont. Code Ann. § 76-1-601(4) (2009). In Montana, land-use plans are
now called "growth policies." Substantively, they are the same as what was previously
referred to in Montana, and still in most states, as a "master plan" or "comprehensive
plan."
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2002, and subsequently reaffirmed it in 2006.101 The plan addresses
the appropriate development of the Rattlesnake Valley as it transitions
from urban Missoula in its lower reaches to the forests and protected
wildlands higher in the valley. 102 Consistent with the nature of the val-
ley, the plan recommends a range of appropriate development densi-
ties, ranging from six to eight dwelling units per acre low in the valley,
to one unit per ten acres on the valley's upper slopes. 103 The "Sonata
Park" proposal approved by the city straddled two density zones that
should have only allowed seven or eight units on 34.08 acres.1 '0 As
noted, the city's ultimate decision approved thirty-seven units.105
In many ways, the Heffernan case is not terribly useful for identify-
ing where we might draw the line between what is or is not "substan-
tial compliance" with a land-use plan because, rather than carefully
consider the Rattlesnake Valley plan, Missoula city officials openly
disregarded it. One member of the Missoula planning board indicated
that he did not "put a lot of weight" on the legal argument regard-
ing the plan. 106 According to this member of the Board, plans don't
create legal obligations, but instead planning "wastes people's
time.""0 7 Other members of the planning board disregarded the plan's
density recommendations because they felt the area needed to "do its
part in providing new homes for Missoula."108 Another felt that the
plan's original drafters desired higher levels of density in the area, not-
withstanding the plan's actual language.109 The city council, determin-
ing in part that Rattlesnake Valley should contribute to the city's need
for new housing and that a landowner should have "considerable say" in
how his property is developed, approved the subdivision by a ten-to-two
vote. 110 As the district court noted, the city "essentially ignored" the
plan's central element, and "ignored or failed to substantiate its find-
ings" regarding other elements of the plan. 11
101. Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 87.
102. Id.; see also Rattlesnake Valley Comprehensive Plan Amendment, 1995 Up-
date, available at ftp://www.co.missoula.mt.us/opgftplDocuments/CompPlans/Rattle
snake/RattlesnakeLP.htm [hereinafter Rattlesnake Plan Amendment].
103. Id.
104. Rattlesnake Plan Amendment, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. Heffeman, 255 P.3d at 89.
107. Id.
108. Heffeman, 255 P.3d at 89.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 90.
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Given this recitation of the basic facts, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determina-
tion that the city had not substantially complied with the Rattlesnake
Valley plan. 1 2 But again, unlike the Kansas approach, the Montana
Supreme Court dedicates significant time to conducting its own review
of the record and is unwilling to rely on the city's characterization of its
decision. While Montana courts might apply a "deferential standard,"
those courts will insist that local governments earn that deference:
A governing body is not entitled to rely on an "it's okay because we said it's okay"
approach when developing the record underlying its decision. As we have pre-
viously indicated, the governing body must develop a record that fleshes out all per-
tinent facts upon which its decision was based in order to facilitate judicial review.
For purposes of evaluating "substantial compliance," that includes all pertinent ele-
ments of the growth policy."13
The Heffernan court's approach to land-use plans suggests that
the content of the plan is relevant and must be directly and specifi-
cally addressed in a site-specific decision.1 14 More than the ultimate
decision--overturning a city's development approval-it is the court's
characterization of the importance of the plan (or "growth policy" in
Montana) that should be our focus:
Growth policies are still "the preeminent planning tool." They are the product of
extensive study, deliberation, and public involvement. The final product is a well
thought out, long range, detailed and comprehensive planning document which
takes into consideration past, present, and anticipated land uses in the jurisdiction
and which is debated and adopted in an atmosphere that is free, to the extent pos-
sible, from the influence of special interests and political expedience. Thus, given
the vital role played by planning boards and the significance attributed to growth
policies . . . it belies common sense to suggest that a governing body no longer
needs to comply with its growth policy.'5
The Heffernan decision provides an indication of what the law might
look like were it faced with clear, detailed, and legitimate land-use
plans. Of course, reviewing courts would have to actually consider
(i.e., read) the relevant plan provisions-unlike the Kansas court in
Manly. But if courts are willing to take their review obligations ser-
iously, even "deferential" approaches to local land-use decisions
might allow for a real implementation of community visions as ex-
pressed in community plans.
112. Id. at 106.
113. Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 105.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 102.
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This brief review of the law suggests two things. Assuming that the
deferential "plan as guide" approach remains the approach in the ma-
jority of the states, our task is to improve the connection between
vision and law. If we desire to create visions that have a meaningful
effect on law, one significant aspect of the "plan as guide" approach
is that specificity matters. General or vague plans might justify a
wide range of outcomes, including outcomes that might not reasonably
be considered to fit within a single "vision" for a place.1 16 Specific
plans narrow the range of future choices, which is presumably the
very purpose of planning-to identify the place a community wants
to be, and then create the necessary tools to get there.
But the review also suggests that the transition required for courts to
treat land-use plans seriously is not significant and can occur under ex-
isting law. As that transition occurs, it will both allow for and require a
more careful approach to crafting community plans. Because the plans
could in fact determine the outcome of site-specific proposals, it is
even more important that they be both specific and as close to the com-
munity's hypothetical best alternative as possible. More to the point,
courts cannot enforce land-use plans unless and until the plans provide
something to enforce.
IV. Collaborative Exclusion: the Failure
of the Neoliberal Planning Paradigm
This article imagines planning from the perspective of a legal commu-
nity tasked with giving legal effect to community plans. The essence
of the argument is that the on-the-ground implementation-i.e., the
law-of community plans can be improved by addressing the origin
and composition of the plans themselves. Planners, who are not as
strictly bound by formal regimes as lawyers, judges, and local govern-
ment officials, can facilitate an improvement in planning law by im-
proving planning. Unfortunately, contemporary community planning
fails in two significant respects. First, its emphasis on participation
and process over substantive outcomes necessarily prefers those inter-
ests most motivated to participate. And second, those same motivated
interests benefit from vague, easily-manipulated planning language
116. See generally Long, supra note 47 (comparing the on-the-ground land-use
outcomes allowed or promoted by a community's comprehensive plan with the claims
made and visions expressed by the community's residents as they went about creating
the plan).
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that facilitates the approval of a wide-array of land-use applications,
even those not contemplated during the plan's creation.
The following discussion of planning theory and contemporary plan-
ning practice adopts an overly simplistic modernist/post-modernist di-
chotomy to explain both the substance and transition of planning ap-
proaches. While it necessarily avoids much of the nuance inherent
in any consideration of the interactions between modernist and post-
modernist thought, it does represent with substantial accuracy both
some of the motivations for transitions in planning theory and practice
over the past few decades, as well as the language planning theorists
themselves use to talk about that transition. 1 7 For our purposes-
which understand plans as community visions reified-the important
distinction is between how the two paradigms understand what consti-
tutes the narrative (or, obviously, narratives) that might legitimately in-
form a community's development. In our story, collaborative planning-
which claims to recognize the validity of multiple narratives and should
distrust claims that any particular narrative is better than any other-
represents post-modern planning, at least in part." 8 This "post-modern
planning"-collaborative planning-is defined here primarily by its
alleged purpose and ideology-at least as the public might understand
it-rather than as planning theorists might define it. In this initial no-
menclature, collaborative planning represents a respect for diversity,
reasonable pluralism, and the value of multiple narratives about a par-
ticular place.1 9 The problem with collaborative planning is that its
pro-modernist origins and tendencies create outcomes that disrespect
those same things. The modernist planning project is much less con-
fused about its role, as it clearly prefers a single narrative, informed
by reason and technical rationality, and implemented as a unitary
plan by a singular authority.' 20
From a legal perspective, with its concerns for legitimacy and im-
plementation, planning fails to guide law effectively in two ways: it
117. See, e.g., PATSY HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE PLANNING: SHAPING PLACES IN FRAG-
MENTED SoCIETIEs, 31-71 (2d ed. 2006); Susan F. Fainstein, New Directions in Plan-
ning Theory, 35 URB. AFF. REV. 451 (1999); ROBERT FIsHIMAN, The American Planning
Tradition: An Introduction and Interpretation, THE AMERICAN PLANNING TRADITION:
CULTURE AND POLICY 1 (2000); Robert A. Beauregard, Without a Net: Modernist Plan-
ning and the Postmodern Abyss, 10 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 189 (1991); Raphael Fisch-
ler, Communicative Planning Theory: A Foucauldian Assessment, 19 J. PLAN. EDUC. &
RES. 358 (2000).
118. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 8.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Beauregard, supra note 117.
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reifies neoliberal hegemony and prefers a single privileged perspective
in a way that delegitimizes planning outcomes, and its consensus-
seeking approach requires outcomes that, if not completely co-opted
by neoliberal interests, are so vague as to provide no rigorous guidance
that might compete effectively with ongoing neoliberal influences on
both local governments and reviewing courts. Because of these plan-
ning failures, contemporary planning and legal practice yield built en-
vironments that are without any community meaning. They are not
without any meaning, but that meaning does not emerge from the so-
cial and cultural structure of any given place. Contemporary planning
theory focuses on process rather than substance, and consequently
reinforces existing power structures.
A. Consensus as Exclusion
Although some alternatives or critiques exist-"mostly on the
fringes"l 2 1-the dominant contemporary planning paradigm is one em-
phasizing communication or collaboration over physical place or place
making.' 22 That is to say, process is more important than on-the-ground
effect.123 This collaborative paradigml 24 occupies a "hegemonic posi-
tion" in contemporary planning theory,1 25 as well as contemporary
planning practice. Generally speaking, collaborative planning operates
from the ground up, allowing both initial ideas and final outcomes to
emerge from the participating elements of the community.12 6 Its
focus and ultimate goal is consensus. 12 7 Consequently, its successes
121. Mark Purcell, Resisting Neoliberalization: Community Planning or Counter-
Hegemonic Movements?, 8 PLAN. THEORY 140, 148 (2009).
122. Other decision-making forums have also adopted collaboration as a useful, if
not exclusive, tool for attempting to enhance legitimacy. See Jody Freeman, Colla-
borative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997).
123. Michael Mascarenhas & Rik Scarce, "The Intention Was Good": Legitimacy,
Consensus-Based Decision Making, and the Case of Forest Planning in British Co-
lumbia, Canada, 17 Soc. & NAT. REs. 17, 18 (2004) (summarizing the arguments
of a number of consensus-based decision making theorists).
124. Although I recognize that "communicative planning" and "collaborative plan-
ning" differ in some important aspects, I will use them somewhat interchangeably
here, given that whatever their differences, the two approaches are largely focused
on process.
125. Mark Purcell, Resisting Neoliberalization: Community Planning or Counter-
Hegemonic Movements? 8 PLAN. THEORY 140, 148 (2009). But see Margo Huxley &
Oren Yiftachel, New Paradigm or Old Myopia? Unsettling the Communicative Turn
in Planning Theory, 19 J. PLAN. EDUC. & REs. 103 (2000).
126. See Patsy Healey, Planning Through Debate: The Communicative Turn in
Planning Theory, 63 THE TOWN PLAN. REv. 143 (1992).
127. Judith E. Innes, Planning Through Consensus Building: A New View of the
Comprehensive Planning Ideal, 62 J. AMER. PLAN. Ass'N 460 (1996).
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and failures are measured by whether it does or does not reach
consensus-based decisions accepted and "owned" by the community.
Collaborative planning emerged both as part of the general post-
modem transition as well as a response to dissatisfaction with the
on-the-ground consequences of specific implementations of the mod-
ernist approach. The modernist planning paradigm posited that the
planner as expert, exercising an instrumental rationalism, could iden-
tify the best approach for a given community. Judith Innes, characteriz-
ing the modernist planner as "systemic," described planners as assum-
ing their purpose is to "maximize welfare and solve problems."1 2 8
Modernist planning, like abstract modernism generally, sought positive
outcomes: "By the application of scientific knowledge and reason to
human affairs, it would be possible to build a better world, in which
the sum of human happiness and welfare would be increased."1 29
Modernist planning assumed that a singular community narrative ex-
isted, and that the planner, through rational, scientific, technocratic
analysis, could identify and implement that narrative.
The problem was how the modernist planner chose to achieve those
ends on the ground. In commenting on the origins of the modernist
planning approach, Robert Beauregard identified "its subtext [as] a
wide-ranging subjugation of society to the functional and aesthetic in-
clinations of a singular perspective."' 30 That singular perspective, of
course, is that of the "expert" planner.1 31 Viewed through an urban-
renewal lens, the critique of modernist urban planning and its singular
perspective is well known. During the early to mid 20th Century, gov-
ernment agencies undertook a range of urban renewal projects, many
of which destroyed existing neighborhoods and successful land
uses. 132 Perhaps the most famous and effective story of the "expert"
planner's negative effects on the ground is Jane Jacobs' The Death
and Life of Great American Cities.'33 Jacobs' critique of expert plan-
ners' failure to understand life and conditions on the ground in our
128. Judith E. Innes, Planning Theory's Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Ac-
tion and Interactive Practice, 14 J. PLAN. EDUC. & REs. 183, 184 (1995).
129. Healey, supra note 126, at 145.
130. Beauregard, supra note 117, at 191.
131. See Robert A. Beauregard, Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Am-
biguous Position of US Planning, 7 ENv. & PLAN. D: Soc'Y AND SPACE 381 (1989).
132. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Davis, Tearing Down Boise, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Nov.
1974, at 32; Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981) overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
133. See JAcOBS, supra note 14; see also FISHMAN, supra note 117.
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cities is amplified by her own role as a non-expert in her battles with
Robert Moses, the epitome of the expert urban planner. 134
But planning's move away from modernism reflects as much a
broader post-modern transition as it does a specific on-the-ground dis-
satisfaction with planning's modernist tendencies. As was the case in
other disciplines, planning developed its own general post-modernist
critique of the broader cultural modernist project. At the end of the
20th Century, following Habermas and the notion of "communicative
rationality,"l 35 planning theory made a "communicative turn" away
from modernism's single rational narrative and toward an arguably
more inclusive approach that recognizes the validity of multiple stor-
ies. 136 Even though Habermas considered communicative rationality
as a pro-modern approach, the collaborative approach, to the extent
that it cares about "place," must recognize that place occupies a com-
plex physical and meta-physical space: "conceptions of 'place' are so-
cial constructs, interweaving the social experience of being in a place,
the symbolic meaning of qualities of a place and the physical-ness of
the forms and flows which go on in it."l 37 The challenge for planning
in this post-modern environment is to develop a community vision for
a place "in full recognition of the complexity and openness of the rela-
tionships which flow across any particular area, and the consequent di-
versity and multiplicity of stakeholders who actively do, or potentially
could, assert a concern about a place."' 38 In this sense, collaborative
planning follows Pragmatism's earlier inquiries into how communities
might value particular ideas: the "best" idea is that which we (as a
community) find most useful after all ideas have been offered and
considered-with the key assumption here being that collaborative
planning is the best process to identify all potential ideas.139
At this point, it is useful to make explicit an assumption-or better
said, caveat-that has been implicit throughout this discussion. The pre-
ceding paragraph continues a theme developed throughout this paper:
134. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK (1974).
135. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1984).
136. See Healy, supra note 126, at 143; HEALY, COLLABORATIVE PLANNING, supra
note 117, at 38-55; Fainstein, supra note 117, at 451.
137. Healey, supra note 8, at 5.
138. Id. at 6.
139. See, e.g., Robert B. Talisse, A Farewell to Deweyan Democracy, 59 POL.
STUD. 509 (2011) (characterizing Peircean Pragmatism as requiring truth claims to
be subjected to all reasonable scrutiny, counter arguments or challenges).
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that our purpose in creating our planning law system is to identify and
implement the "best" version of the single "community" at issue. But
there can be no single best future, nor is it possible to identify any sin-
gle community that should be the single community whose "best" we
should seek to achieve. While community might refer to a number of
distinct social groups, planning generally considers community to
refer to social organizations oriented around a specific place: "an inte-
grated, place-based social world."' 4 0 But notwithstanding that general
understanding, the ideal "place-based community culture" does not
exist, or if such communities do exist or have existed, they are "limit-
ing and stifling," failing to take into account the diversity of legitimate
and reasonable perspectives. 14 1
Because of the diversity of thought, purpose, or visions of the future
that are inherent in any given place, any singular community plan will
necessarily be oppressive of some portion of the community. This is
an inherent and unavoidable element of any liberal democratic sys-
tem: "Under the political and social conditions secured by the
basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting
and irreconcilable-and what's more, reasonable-comprehensive
doctrines will come about and persist. . . ." Holding to any one
plan, or single comprehensive perspective, requires the oppression
of all other reasonable visions.' 4 3
Just as this is not a reason to jettison democracy in its entirety,
neither should it threaten the legitimacy of community planning or at-
tempts to identify a "best" future for a given community. But given the
planning law system's inherent tendency to prefer power-reinforcing
outcomes, 14 4 we must carefully consider whether the collaborative
planning paradigm furthers that same tendency by enabling the same
oppression of a community's reasonable pluralism. 145
140. HEALY, supra note 117, at 123.
141. Id. at 124.
142. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (2005).
143. See id. at 37.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12; see also Molotch, City as Growth
Machine, supra note 15, at 309; see also Molotch, Political Economy, supra note
34 at 29.
145. See generally RAWLS, supra note 142; Robert B. Talisse, Can Democracy be a
Way of Life? Deweyan Democracy and the Problem of Pluralism, 39 TRANS. OF THE
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE Soc'Y 1, 4 (2003) ("pluralism implies that there is no substan-
tive and basic value that could win the consensus of an entire population of rational
persons").
375
376 THE URBAN LAWYER
Although the collaborative or communicative model now represents
the predominant planning paradigm,146 it is not without its critics; and
much of that criticism focuses on the allegedly non-inclusive-and
thus unnecessarily oppressive-aspects of communicative planning.
Although collaborative planning theorists characterize collaborative
planning as "a democratic exercise aimed at promoting social justice
and environmental sustainability,"l47 its critics allege is has precisely
the opposite result in many cases. The non-inclusive aspect of colla-
borative planning emerges from a tendency-likely unintentional and
certainly unstated-to prefer neoliberalism as the foundational ideology
of community planning. This tendency is embedded in collaborative
planning's theoretical origins, suggesting that despite its claimed re-
spect for multiple narratives and conceptions of place, collaborative
planning is not post-modernist as I have characterized, but decidedly
and distinctly pro-modern.
Habermas's communicative rationality was originally a liberal de-
fense of modernism,1 48 and it assumed that communication would
allow the identification of a single consensus narrative accepted by
an entire community: "A (if not the) basic assumption of communica-
tive rationality is that consensus can be reached.""' 9 For Habermas,
this consensus narrative represented a better modernism, since it
emerged from the community rather than being imposed on it, but it
did still rely on finding a single unitary narrative.s15 From the planning
theorist's perspective, in this Habermasian approach, open communi-
cation, with all potential participants enjoying equal status and access
to available information, can lead to identifiable 'truths:' "If based on
principles of honesty, sincerity, and openness, to people's views and to
available knowledge, then these truths and values can transcend the re-
lativism of different perspectives."' Communicative planning, with
146. HEALEY, supra note 117; Fainstein, supra note 117, at 451; Innes, supra note
128, at 183.
147. Quoted in M. Tewdwr-Jones & P. Allmendinger, Deconstructing Communica-
tive Rationality: A Critique of Habermasian Collaborative Planning, 30 ENV'T AND
PLAN. A 1975, 1978 (1998).
148. See FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CA-
PITALISM 55-61 (1991).
149. Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, supra note 147, at 1979.
150. See, e.g., HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE PLANNING, supra note 117; see also Tim Ri-
chardson, Foucauldian Discourse: Power and Truth in Urban and Regional Policy
Making, 4 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 279 (1996).
151. HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE PLANNING, supra note 117; see also JORGEN HABERMAS,
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETmIs (1993).
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its focus on rational communication and its goal of identifying a uni-
fied planning narrative, is therefore theoretically pro-modernist.15 2
This pro-modernist position of collaborative planning is inconsistent
with my characterization of collaborative planning as a post-modernist
response to the failures of mid-20th Century modern planning. But the
transition from communicative to collaborative planning represents
a dissatisfaction, at least in part, with several components of a strictly
Habermasian planning project. One significant concern is the modernist
notion of unitary truths, which Habermas retained and defended in his
communicative rationality.' 53 But perhaps more significant, Haberma-
sian communicative rationality ignores potential power differentials
among participants.' 5 4
Collaborative planning's focus on process, and failure to address
power differentials among the participants (or potential participants),
reinforces the status quo and allows for entrenched, land-based power
interests to dominate the planning process.'5 5 "The turn to argument
has thrust planning theory squarely into the domain of power relations.
Yet this emerging paradigm remains blinkered to the dynamics of
power."' 6 Collaborative planning theorists obviously do not intend
this outcome, but "the evidence suggests that collaborative, or commu-
nicative planning, has been largely captured, or has been intentionally
deployed, to obscure and facilitate the dominant ideology of contem-
porary market forces."'5 7 In many ways, this is almost inevitable. As
discussed above, a neoliberal reliance on markets as the ideology of
governance and the logic of neoclassical economic theory yields plan-
ning outcomes that prefer specific arguments. As significant, neoliberal
rhetoric-in almost all ways synonymous with modernism and the ar-
guments and principles of the Enlightenment-claims a privileged
space among competing narratives. It is, after all, the language of
science and rationality. And finally, reinforcing this privileged space,
those interests that most benefit from neoliberal planning hegemony
are most likely to participate in the planning process, given the specific
and identifiable economic benefits and "harms" at issue.
152. Richardson, supra note 150, at 279.
153. See HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE PLANNING, supra note 117.
154. Michael Gunder, Planning as the Ideology of (Neoliberal) Space, 9 PLAN. THE-
ORY 298 (2010).
155. See Molotch, City as Growth Machine, supra note 15, at 309; see also Mo-
lotch, Political Economy, supra note 34, at 29.
156. Richardson, supra note 150, at 279.
157. Gunder, supra note 154, at 302.
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These outcomes are particularly ironic given that collaborative plan-
ning finds some of its inspiration in Dewey's Pragmatism.11 A colla-
borative planning that reinforces neoliberal hegemony necessarily
constrains the potential options available for a community. This is a
failure of democracy and the original goals of collaborative planning:
"The democratic deficit here is that a polity can hardly be considered
democratic if it cannot offer its citizens meaningful options. Citizens
might have formal decision-making power, but their range of deci-
sions can become so narrow as to not really be decisions at all." 159
From this perspective, collaborative planning is ultimately no more in-
clusive than Robert Moses and the redevelopment of New York. 160
B. But What Would "Consensus" Look Like?
Public choice problems, embedded neoliberal ideologies, and growth-
motivated preferences of local officials, yield planning outcomes that
are exclusive rather than inclusive, notwithstanding the claims of col-
laborative planning theorists. Rather than identifying new, better, and
community-legitimated futures, collaborative planning reinforces the
status quo and entrenched power interests. But even if collaborative
planning's neoliberal preferences are overstated, the focus on consen-
sus building necessarily yields planning outcomes that are insufficient
to guide on-the-ground legal decisions.
Planning theory does not appear to have identified or adopted its
own uniform definition of "consensus." A popular dictionary defines
consensus as "a general agreement: unanimity."l 61 Some planning the-
orists recognize that unanimity is likely impossible, and so suggest
that "in practice . . . a recommended and achievable goal is 80-90 per-
cent [agreement], making sure that stakeholders from all the major in-
terests are included." 1 62 But as discussed above, the planner's consen-
sus emerged, in part, from Habermasian communicative rationality
with its goal of identifying unitary truths or values for particular com-
munities. 163 In this Habermasian approach, a primary goal is to avoid
158. See Fainstein, supra note 117, at 453 ("The communicative model draws on
two philosophical approaches-American pragmatism as developed in the thought
of John Dewey and Richard Rorty and the theory of communicative rationality as
worked out by Jirgen Habermas.")
159. Purcell, supra note 121, at 145-46.
160. See CARO, supra note 134.
161. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICIONARY (11th ed. 2006).
162. Judith E. Innes, Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics, 3 PLANNING
THEORY 17, (2004).
163. See Innes, supra note 127.
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the oppression that occurs when one worldview is imposed on another.
In other words, in the Habermasian context of contemporary colla-
borative planning, consensus means-or should at least approach-
unanimous assent. Without unanimous assent, some oppression is
inevitable.
It is largely for this reason that in a consensus-based approach, the
"success" of the outcome is not measured by scientific or other ra-
tional, modernist measures-that is to say, success is not determined
by comparing on-the-ground consequences to the problems or conflicts
that motivated the activity in the first place. Rather, participants mea-
sure success by considering the process: "breadth of representation in
the planning process, the political or social acceptability of the agree-
ment, improved relationships with others and with agencies, the
amount of learning that may occur, and the prevalence of a sense of
'ownership' of the plan by non-agency personnel." 1" The emphasis
on process in a consensus approach is understandable. Without the
perception-among the affected community-that the decision-making
process was open, inclusive, and democratic, the ultimate outcome
would lack legitimacy.' 6 5
But if we accept a pluralist society, it is clear that consensus is im-
possible on all but the simplest of questions. What a particular com-
munity should look like, how we should use (or not use) particular
natural resources, the "highest and best" use of a particular parcel of
land, are not the types of questions that lend themselves to consensus,
as anyone who pays even passing attention to land-use disputes recog-
nizes. In the land-use planning context, consensus necessarily means
simple, vague, and largely unenforceable.
This characteristic of consensus-built planning outcomes is more
obvious when we consider actual plans on the ground. One example
of a consensus-built land-use plan is the document adopted by Koote-
nai County, Idaho in late 2010.166 While Kootenai County is in a re-
latively conservative state, and consequently might be assumed to
have greater neoliberal tendencies than other places, it is one of
many western communities that has undergone fairly substantial social
164. See Mascarenhas, supra note 123, at 18.
165. See id. at 25-32.
166. Kootenai County is in northern Idaho. It is home to Lake Coeur d'Alene,
the resort town of Coeur d'Alene, and significant portions of the Idaho Panhandle
National Forest. It is part of a continuous urban corridor with Spokane, Washington,
along Interstate 90. It is also downstream from the nation's largest CERCLA Super-
fund site, the Bunker Hill Mining District.
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and cultural change over the past few decades.167 While this would not
eliminate its neoliberal tendencies, and in fact might reinforce them,' 68
it does suggest that Kootenai County's experience is representative of
communities undergoing local land-use conflicts-precisely the cir-
cumstances in which collaborative planning should be most useful.
Beginning in 2006, Kootenai County began revising a comprehen-
sive land use plan that had been in place since 1994. As the final ver-
sion of the plan reported, its "fundamental premise . .. is attention to
the clear public sentiment that the County's beauty and culture not be
compromised and that growth occurs in a responsible way that pre-
serves these virtues." 169 A recurring theme throughout the process
was the desire to avoid mistakes that plagued the previous plan, which
apparently included under-regulated development in the county's rural
areas. 170
Several factors present in Kootenai County-recent rapid population
growth, concern about development on rural lands, and the "fundamen-
tal premise" that the County should protect "beauty and culture"-
suggest an outcome that would address and limit rural development.1 7 1
167. See, e.g., Hannah Gosnell & Jesse Abrams, Amenity Migration: Diverse Con-
ceptualizations of Drivers, Socioecnomic Dimensions, and Emerging Challenges, GEO-
JOURNAL (2009); Richelle Winkler et al., Social Landscapes in the Intermountain West:
A Comparison of 'Old West' and 'New West' Communities, 72 RURAL Soc. 478 (2007);
Soren C. Larsen et al., Place Perception and Social Interaction on a Exurban Land-
scape in Central Colorado, 59 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 421 (2007); Rita Ghose, Big Sky or
Big Sprawl? Rural Gentrification and the Changing Cultural Landscape of Missoula,
Montana, 25 URB. GEOGRAPHY 528 (2004); Gayla Smutny & Lois Takahashi, Eco-
nomic Change and Environmental Conflict in the Western Mountain States of the
USA, 31 ENV'T & PLAN. A 979 (1999); Andrew J. Hansen et al., Ecological Causes
and Consequences of Demographic Change in the New West, 52 BIOSCIENCE 151
(2002); Peter B. Nelson, Perceptions of Restructuring in the Rural West: Insights
from the "Cultural Turn", 15 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCEs 903 (2002); Peter B. Nelson,
Rural Restructuring in the American West: Land Use, Family, and Class Discourses,
17 J. RURAL STUD. 395 (2001); J. Matthew Shumway & Samuel M. Otterstrom, Spatial
Patterns of Migration and Income Change in the Mountain West: The Dominance of
Service-Based, Amenity-Rich Counties, 53 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 492 (2001); Debra
Ohman, Restructuring and Well-Being in the Non-Metropolitan Pacific Northwest,
30 GROWTH & CHANGE 161 (1999).
168. See Long, supra note 47.
169. KCCP ch. 1 § 3 (2010).
170. The 1994 Plan contained only two goals directly relevant to rural residential
development densities. The goals' objectives provided little additional specificity.
Those goals were: Goal 9: "Develop land use regulations that protect property rights,
maintain quality of life, provide adequate land for development, buffer non-compatible
land uses, and protect the environment." Goal 10: "Guide population growth to allow
for inevitable expansion without sacrificing the environment or the quality of life
which currently characterizes Kootenai County." The zoning ordinances that emerged
from these goals are discussed below.
171. KCCP ch. 1 § 3 (2010).
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But focusing specifically on the issue of rural residential density-
where population growth, development on rural lands, and "beauty
and culture" intersect-the plan takes an unexpected approach.)12
Although the plan recognizes the effects of several decades of rapid po-
pulation growth, and identifies protecting the county's natural resources
and rural characteristics as its most fundamental goal, it provides very
little substance that might lead toward those goals.
The comprehensive plan proposes several new categories of rural
land use, with five specifically residential classifications, but only
two of which are primarily rural residential classifications. 1 7 3 For
rural lands, the primary residential classification is "country.""' The
plan identifies the "country" designation as those lands which should
have the "third lowest density," relative to "scenic" and "resource/
recreation," which are not intended as residential classifications.17 5
"Country" is intended to "maintain the rural atmosphere and rural
quality of life in the unincorporated part of the County."1 76 These
"country" lands are "characterized by activities including, but not lim-
ited to, small-scale farms, dispersed single-family homes, and open
space. . . ." 77 The next more densely-developed lands are "suburban,"
which are low to moderate density.17 8 The next less densely-developed
lands-"resource/recreation"-are "characterized by activities includ-
ing, but not limited to, resource-oriented activities (farming, timber,
and mineral extraction), open space, and residential. . . ."179 Resource/
recreation is primarily a rural industrial category.
172. In Spring 2011, my seminar students engaged in a regulatory mapping exer-
cise of the Spokane River watershed, focusing on land-use controls. Several of the stu-
dents grew up in the area, and we all began the exercise with our perceptions of the
political and cultural personalities of the various places. Of all the land-use regimes
across the watershed, this specific component of Kootenai County's regimes-rural
residential densities-was the most surprising. The regime is otherwise somewhat re-
strictive, with a variety of resource-protective measures. We expected the same for
rural residential development, but didn't find it.
173. That plan has three classifications-transitional, village, and shoreline-that
are on the rural-urban interface, or otherwise are within areas of high expected density,
i.e., not rural. KCCP ch. 14 § 26 (2010).
174. KCCP ch. 14 § 26 (2010).
175. The "scenic" designation applies almost exclusively to public lands managed
by the National Forest Service, unavailable for development. The Plan specifically
identifies "scenic" lands as lands "not typically available for development due to pub-
lic land ownership[.]" Id. at ch. 14 § 34. The remaining lands are largely classified
"resource/recreation," which are designed to "promote large acre agriculture, timber,
mining, and recreational opportunities. . . ." Id.
176. KCCP ch. 14 § 35 (2010).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. KCCP ch. 14 § 34 (2010).
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In the abstract, these land-use designations and recommended resi-
dential densities are largely meaningless. They are anchored on one
side by suburban development, which is sufficiently common to pro-
vide some guidance, but the plan provides no usable definition or de-
scription of "rural," which might provide a boundary on the other
side."so But they were established in a specific context, with a specific
regulatory history, and that context provides some understanding of
what "rural" might mean in this place. For the past four decades,
Kootenai County's least dense zoning designation has been "rural,"
which still covers the majority of the county and allows for a minimum
lot size of five acres. 18 1 The zones closer to the urban areas and lakes
allow lot sizes as small as 8250 square feet (just under one-fifth of an
acre). 182 As a result of these zoning ordinances, the majority of the
"rural" residential parcels in the county are fairly small. An inventory
conducted in 2007 determined that of the almost 30,000 residential par-
cels that existed in the county at that time, 56% were less than two acres
in size, and 70% were less than five acres.1 83
At one point, the draft comprehensive plan contained a recommen-
dation that "rural" residential areas allow one unit per ten to twenty
acres, 1 84 and that "rural infill" residential areas allow one unit per
three to ten acres. Some participants criticized these provisions as
allowing for too much density, while others-including realtors and
developers-didn't want any density designations in the plan.' 8 5 In
180. This is not entirely true. The Plan's glossary does define "rural" as "A sparsely
developed area where the land is largely undeveloped or primarily used for resource
purposes." See KCCP, Glossary, 8. But this definition is inconsistent with the descrip-
tion of the "country" land-use designation. In fact, the "scenic" designation-which is
primarily undevelopable public lands-was originally titled "rural," and this definition
of rural appears to be a remnant of that earlier classification. See Alecia Warren, The 3
'Rs' of Revision: County Officials Still Tweaking Comp Plan, COEUR D'ALENE PRESS,
Dec. 15, 2010. A more relevant definition, if still less than useful, is "rural lifestyle,"
defined as: "Subjective term based on individual values. A distinctive character iden-
tified by individuals or neighborhoods that involve lower population density, natural
or agricultural land use, and a degree of privacy and quiet in contrast to an urban life-
style." See KCCP, Glossary, 8.
181. KCCP ch. 14 § 4.
182. KCCP ch. 14 § 5.
183. KCCP ch. 14 § 4.
184. As noted above, the "rural" designation is now "scenic." So although the sug-
gested densities appear to be some improvement (assuming less dense rural develop-
ment is better, which is not always the case), those reduced densities only applied in
portions of the county that are already largely undevelopable, because they are primar-
ily public lands managed by the National Forest Service.
185. See, e.g., comments by Concerned Businesses of North Idaho, June 6, 2008
(disagreeing with the suggested densities); comments by Joe Dobson, Land and
Rural Properties Manager, Coldwell Banker, Schneidmiller Realty, (undated, received
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other words, the community had not reached consensus on what devel-
opment should be allowed in the county's undeveloped areas. In May
2010, after over three years of work and nearing the end of the process,
the county commissioners removed the specific residential densities
from the plan, leaving the vague descriptions referenced above.' 86
Although Kootenai County has yet to adopt ordinances implement-
ing these aspects of its new comprehensive plan, the draft working or-
dinances are available for review and comment." The draft ordi-
nances implement the plan's eight proposed future land uses as ten
distinct zoning districts that generally reflect the spirit of the plan's
designations.18 8 In most cases, the differences between the Plan's fu-
ture land uses and ultimate zoning ordinances are understandable. For
example, the Plan's "resource and recreation" designation and its as-
sociated uses appear to have been allocated among the "Farming and
Forestry," "Mining," and "Scenic" zoning districts.189 Similarly, the
Plan's "Village" has been implemented as an allowed land use in
the Farming and Forestry, Countryside, Estate, Suburban, and Planned
Regional Destination zoning districts, rather than as its own distinct
zoning district.190
These differences between the plan and its implementation are rela-
tively uncontroversial. More interesting is how the draft ordinance im-
plements the residential densities that were not included in the plan.
Although the county has not released its draft zoning map, the Plan
suggests most of the developable rural land will be placed in the "Coun-
tryside" zoning district. 191 The Countryside's proposed standard density
is fifteen acres per dwelling unit, with various cluster-development stra-
tegies allowing up to five acres per dwelling unit gross density, and
two acres per dwelling unit net density (within the actual development
by county June 8, 2008) ("this is designated a no growth document") (all cited com-
ments on file with author and available from Kootenai County).
186. See Alecia Warren, Acreage Pulled From Plan Proposal, COEUR D'ALENE PRESS,
May 20, 2010, available at http://www.cdapress.com/news/local-news/article_69ba7bOc-
7bbf-54eb-9fc5-41 1b55792alf.html. Members of the planning commission expressed
some dissatisfaction with the commissioners' participation in the planning process,
on this and other issues; see also Kathlene Kolts, Special to the Press, Time to Get
Comp Plan Done, COEUR D'ALENE PRESS, Feb. 26, 2010.
187. See KOOTENAI COUNTY UNIFIED LAND USE CODE, available at http://www.
zoningplus.com/regs/kootenail (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
188. See KOOTENAI COUNTY UNIFIED LAND USE CODE § 2-1-1.
189. See id. at § 2-3-2 at Table 2-3-2.
190. See id. at § 2-3-3 at Table 2-3-3.
191. The "Countryside" zoning designation implements the Plan's "Country" fu-
ture land use designation, which accounts for most of the county's developable private
land. See KCCP ch. 14 § 26.
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cluster).' 92 These densities are roughly consistent with the densities
originally included in, but ultimately removed from, the County
Plan.193
Whether these densities are included in the final ordinances remains
to be seen. But it remains possible that the ultimate densities imple-
mented over time will be more similar to the past zoning ordinance
than the currently proposed densities. First, the comprehensive plan it-
self recommends a high level of rural development, notwithstanding
suggestions to the contrary. The county's development pattern is cur-
rently 70% urban to 30% rural. 194 The comprehensive plan indicates a
preference for maintaining this pattern in the future. 195 The current
average lot size in unincorporated Kootenai County is less than four
acres, and as noted above, over half of existing parcels are less than
two acres. As the county continues to grow, maintaining 30% of devel-
opment in the rural areas will necessarily require fitting more people in
increasingly less space, requiring more dense rural development across
rural areas, rather than less.196
But more significant, all private land in the county has been zoned
for five-acre minimum lots for four decades. Any change in zoning
designations would necessarily reduce the developable value of unde-
veloped rural lands by reducing the number of units that could be built
on those lands. While landowners are not constitutionally entitled to
the continuation of a zoning ordinance, 197 down zoning is extremely
difficult and controversial politically, to the point that it often exceeds
the political authority (if not the Constitutional authority) available
in a given place. Absent a significantly changed socio-ecological
context-which the final comprehensive plan language suggests is
not present-meaningful downzoning is highly unlikely. 198
192. KCCP ch. 14 § 26, table 3-2-1.
193. See Warren, supra note 186.
194. KCCP ch. 2 § 1 (2010).
195. See id. Ada County, Idaho, home to Boise and Idaho's largest metropolitan
area, targets 3% rural development in its comprehensive plan.
196. Targeted density (i.e., cluster developments or development near urban areas)
would, of course, allow for the preservation of more "rural" land. But the plan places
most of that targeted density in the 70% desired urban development.
197. See, e.g., Hale v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for Town of Blacksburg, 673 S.E.2d
170, 180 (Va. 2009) ("when a landowner has only a future expectation that he will be
allowed to develop his property in accord with its current classification under the local
zoning ordinance, there is 'no vested property right in the continuation of the land's
existing zoning status' ").
198. Although it may only represent a loud minority, some opposition to the per-
ceived takings of property rights (i.e., downzoning) has already emerged. See Alecia
Warren, Building, Zoning Law Rewrite in Question, COEUR D'ALENE PREss, Aug. 30,
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The point of this example is not to suggest that this county did any-
thing wrong in either its planning process or the proposed zoning dis-
tricts or uses implementing the plan. Nor do I intend to suggest that the
draft ordinances are inconsistent with the Kootenai County plan. To
the contrary, they are absolutely consistent, because almost anything
would have been. The plan's guidance for residential density in the
country land use designation consisted of the suggestion that it be
more dense than the immediately less dense category, that it consist
of "dispersed" single family homes, and that it be less dense and qui-
eter than urban uses. 199 These descriptions do little more than indicate
the proposed uses should not be urban or suburban. It is then up to the
much less inclusive and participatory ordinance-drafting process to
determine what the place will actually ultimately look like.
To put a somewhat finer point on this argument, consider the designa-
tion "rural," which appears with some regularity in non-metropolitan
planning documents.2 oo Rurality is socially constructed (and con-
tested), and our expectations for a place determine whether it is
rural or not. For a rancher traveling to town for groceries and supplies,
Wheatland, Wyoming-with its developed "downtown" of stores and
bars, and the massive coal-fired power plant just outside town-might
feel crowded and urban. For the CEO of a Dallas-based energy com-
pany, passing through on the way to visit a billion dollar coalmine or
natural gas development, Wheatland is just a wide spot in the road, of-
fering little but wind and sagebrush.
The differing ideas of rural possessed by this rancher and CEO are
reflected in the diverse rural studies literature. Researchers have at-
tempted many different approaches to defining the rural but are unable
2011, available at http://www.cdapress.com/news/localnews/article-badafal5-ff44-
5556-b44b920b4715.html.
199. See KCCP ch. 14 §§ 20, 35.
200. In addition to, the language from Kootenai County discussed above, see, e.g.,
Rourr CouNry [Colorado] MASTER PLAN at 7 (2003), available at http://www.co.routt.
co.us/planning/plans/Master%20Plan.pdf ("The general goal of the Plan is to ensure
the rural character while accommodating appropriate development."); GRAND COUNTY
[Utah] DRAFT MASTER PLAN (2011), available at http://www.grandcountyutah.net/pdf/
planning/general-plan/GrandCountyGeneralPlanDRAFTlO-7-2011web.pdf (charac-
terizing Grand County as a "recreation-based, western, rural community[,]" and
using "rural" throughout to describe development densities); TETON COUNTY [Wyom-
ing] COMPREHENSIVE PLAN at ES 8 (2011), available at http://www.jacksontetonplan.
com/files/2011/07/110706_JacksonTetonPart1_ExecutiveSummary.pdf ("Managing
growth means proactively planning for what we want-rural open spaces and high
quality, desirable complete neighborhoods.").
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to arrive at any consensus. 20 1 Keith Halfacree identified four ap-
proaches to defining rural-descriptive, socio-cultural, rural as locality,
and rural as social representation-but (although he personally prefers
the "rural as locality approach") ultimately suggested that the "quest
for any single, all-embracing definition of the rural is neither desirable
nor feasible." 202 Michael Woods notes that 'rural' is one of those cur-
ious words which everyone thinks they know what it means, but which
is actually very difficult to define precisely." 203 Woods does not at-
tempt to provide his own, more precise definition of "rural." Rather,
he approaches the issue from place toward definition (rather than ap-
plying definition to place), choosing to address the rural by seeking to
understand "how particular places, objects, traditions, practices and peo-
ple come to be identified as 'rural' and the difference that this makes to
how people live their everyday lives." 204
But notwithstanding the lack of a cohesive definition of rural, 'rural'
areas tend to share at least one quality in common: the people who live
in or visit the place think of it as rural. Rural people believe that their
place is different from more developed, busier, 'urban' areas. The per-
ceived pace of life might be slower, interpersonal relationships differ-
ent, or social, cultural, or moral values distinct from the values of non-
rural areas. The rancher visiting Wheatland, Wyoming likely feels that
Wheatland is somehow different from Denver, or even Cheyenne,
even if she considers Wheatland less rural than her 5000-acre ranch.
There might be more open space, more farms, more cows or wildlife,
more pickup trucks, more people saying hello on the streets; but what-
ever the specific quality or combination of qualities, something makes
residents and visitors think 'rural.' In this way, 'rural' is less about the
physical characteristics or economy of a place than it is about how re-
sidents perceive-or wish they could perceive-their place.
It is precisely this socially-constructed understanding of 'rural' (or
any other potential description of a place) that communities should ex-
plore in the planning process. The planning process should develop
and identify the meaning a particular community assigns the term, if
it is relevant in determining the development future of a particular
place. But when a community chooses not to engage in the difficult
201. See BRIAN ILBERY, Dimensions of Rural Change, THE GEOGRAPHY OF RuRAL
CHANGE 1-10 (1998) (discussing the various approaches to defining "rural").
202. Keith Halfacree, Locality and Social Representation: Space, Discourse and
Alternative Definitions of the Rural, 9 J. RURAL STUD. 23, 34 (1993).
203. MICHAEL WOODS, RuRAL GEOGRAPHY 15 (2005).
204. Id.
VOL. 44, No. 2 SPRING 2012
NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
work of precisely determining meaning, as Kootenai County arguably
did in the example provided here, or when a consensus-based approach
cannot approach the fundamental, if difficult, questions required to
define and describe, that task is left to ordinance drafters, who must
make the choices avoided in the planning process. That is precisely
the non-inclusive, technocratic approach that collaborative planning
seeks to avoid.
Contemporary collaborative planning suffers from two weaknesses
that inhibit the creation of inclusive and effective community visions:
it prefers entrenched power structures and adopts a consensus-based
approach yielding vague plans that can be implemented in multiple,
disparate fashions. The solution is for everyone associated with the
planning process-planners, local government officials, and land-use
lawyers-to act with specificity and purpose. Public goods will not ne-
cessarily emerge from a collaborative planning process that advan-
tages neoliberal orthodoxy over building good communities. And
creating vague plans-a necessary byproduct of any attempt at making
everyone happy in a consensus-based collaborative process-provides
little guidance for future decisions and provides additional opportu-
nities for the on-the-ground realization of community visions to move
away from what the community might have originally desired. But a
Pragmatic and specific plan not only increases the likelihood that the
community might be able to identify and implement its "best" future,
but also constrains the influence of the growth machine and reduces
the anti-community aspects of neo-liberal, "collaborative" approaches.
That should be the goal of community planning.
V. Selected Lamarckism: Creating and Achieving
the Public Good
The failure of the market to provide diversity in most places means that if planners
do not attempt to foster it, the outcome will be increasingly segregated neighbor-
hoods and municipalities.
2 0 5
Underlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption that zoning can be a
vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we employ the in-
sights and the learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the economist, the so-
ciologist, the public health expert and all the other professions concerned with
urban problems. 206
This critique of contemporary collaborative planning does not recom-
mend its elimination. Nor do I intend my discussion of both collabora-
205. Fainstein, supra note 117, at 465.
206. Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968).
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tion and consensus-based decision making to reflect a dissatisfaction
with, or rejection of, the value of consensus-based or participatory
democracy. To the contrary, as I have emphasized throughout this ar-
ticle, effective land-use plans are those plans that are maximally inclu-
sive, allowing for the participation and input of all potentially inter-
ested parties. Only those inclusive plans are legitimate and can form
the foundation for legitimate law. But consensus-based decisions
both reinforce existing power structures and fail to provide adequate
guidance to legal actors.
The task then is to identify a planning law system that might be both
inclusive as well as technocratic, that can rely on the input of the af-
fected communities-earning their blessings-as well as take advan-
tage of the expertise and experience of those epistemic communities
we have assigned to provide guidance and develop truth claims, i.e.,
"experts." Local governments, planners, or even local stakeholder
groups, must recognize that good community visions must be provided
to the community for its consideration and blessing. They will not ne-
cessarily emerge from that community. And those local governments
and planners must create and enact those visions with enough specifi-
city to effectively constrain future land-use choices.
The solution presented here relies on several theoretical assump-
tions, which are discussed and explained-at least implicitly-in the
following section. First, the only way to know the value of a particular
idea is to imagine (or empirically witness) the actual consequences of
acting on the idea, and then to compare those actual consequences to
the consequences that might result from plausible alternatives. This is
the essence of planning: we develop plausible futures and then com-
pare the imagined consequences of each to select the option that
seems best at that moment.207 But the key aspect is that we cannot
identify what we might prefer until we have actually identified what
our options might be.208 Second, the best future for a given place
can only emerge if all possible futures are presented and available
for consideration. The only way to ensure that all possible, plausible
futures are presented is to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to
participate in the vision-forming process. This is the essence of a Prag-
207. There are analogs in other areas of the law. For example, the alternatives ana-
lysis is considered the "heart" of the environmental impact statement required by the
National Environmental Policy Act. See National Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.
R. § 1502.14 (2012).
208. See DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE
MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 144 (2006).
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matic democracy. As Susan Fainstein argued in her critique of commu-
nicative planning theory: "The aroused consciousness that puts ideas
into practice involves leadership and the mobilization of power, not
simply people reasoning together." 209 Good ideas are not implemented
or recognized through accidental processes or "natural" evolution.
Rather, the implementation of good ideas requires intentional action.
Combining these considerations suggests a selected Lamarckism: evo-
lutionary change driven by intentional action that is ultimately selected
based on its actual effects on the ground. In the planning context, a
selected Larmarckism would involve a technocratic and inclusive Prag-
matism: experts-potentially from a variety of disciplines or local stake-
holder groups-create multiple, alternative visions for a place with the
specific goal of identifying public goods and representing the under-
represented elements of the community. These experts would not
wait for planning ideas to emerge from the community, and-perhaps
unfortunately-would not be limited to consensus-based approaches.
As is obvious in its title, this approach borrows from the evolution-
ary theory developed by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. To paraphrase it in a
way that is relevant to the current discussion, Larmarckian evolution is
the largely discredited theory that animals can "force" evolution, and
the creation of specific traits, by physically trying to develop those
traits. 2 10 More accurate, if still incomplete, Lamarck posited two
things. First, that the continued use of an "organ" strengthens, develops
and enlarges that organ, and that disuse has the opposite effect, ulti-
mately causing the organ to disappear. And second, that any such
changes that occur in an individual during its life are passed on to its
offspring. Animals (or other organisms) can acquire traits during life,
in response to environmental conditions, which are then passed on to
their offspring. For example, a giraffe that reaches for leaves on the
top of the tree will lengthen and strengthen its neck, and that longer,
stronger neck will then be passed on. Darwinian evolution, in contrast,
posits that a long neck is the result of genetic accidents that turn out to
provide a competitive advantage over those members of the species
without the same trait, i.e., the long-necked giraffes were better able
209. Fainstein, supra note 117, at 458.
210. See JEAN BAPTISTE PIERRE ANTOINE DE MONET DE LAMARCK, ZooLoGICAL PHILO-
SOPHY. AN EXPOSITION WITH REGARD TO THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ANIMALS (1984); La-
marck's ideas are enjoying some new found respect. See Michael Balter, Genetics:
Was Lamarck Just a Little Bit Right? 288 SCIENCE 38 (2000); Eva Jablonka, Marion
J. Lamb, & Eytan Avital, 'Lamarckian' Mechanisms in Darwinian Evolution, 13
TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 206 (1998).
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to obtain adequate nutrition, in a specific context, and thus more likely
to create offspring containing the same genetic trait.2 11
A number of theorists have used Lamarckian evolution as an ana-
logy useful for explaining change in a wide array of social processes.
Boyd and Richerson developed a detailed theory of cultural evolution
containing a component they called "guided variation." 212 Guided var-
iation recognizes the capacity for "adaptation through rational calcula-
tion," which occurs when individuals collect information about the en-
vironment, estimate the results of various choices, and evaluate the
desirability of those outcomes according to some criteria.2 13 This pro-
cess directly affects the culture that emerges: "humans are embedded
in a complex social network through which they actively participate in
the creation and perpetuation of their culture." 214 It is through the
guided variation process-i.e., the process of imagining futures and
identifying the means or choices to get there-that we develop our
goals or preferences.
Boyd and Richerson are not alone in recognizing the usefulness of a
Lamarckian analogy in understanding cultural change. F.A. Hayek
described cultural evolution as simulating Lamarckism: "all cultural
development rests on [the inheritance of acquired characteristics]-
characteristics in the form of rules guiding the mutual relations
among individuals which are not innate but learnt." 215 Paul McLaugh-
lin described a "socially constructed adaptive landscape" in which var-
ious cultural actors can "alter their structural contexts by engaging in
various discursive and claims-making activities and by directly em-
ploying economic and political power." 216 Although McLaughlin dis-
tinguishes his approach from Lamarck's by suggesting that Lamarck
posited a "context independent natural path of change," 2 17 the socially
constructed adaptive cultural landscape is consistent with the acquisi-
tion of acquired cultural characteristics.
211. See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELEC-
TION, OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (6th ed. 1872).
212. ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
(1985). Guided variation is only one component of Boyd and Richerson's broader the-
ory of cultural evolution.
213. Id. at 9.
214. ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CULTURES
290 (2005).
215. F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIAiSM 25 (1988).
216. Paul McLaughlin, Toward an Ecology of Social Action: Merging the Ecologi-
cal and Constructivist Traditions, 8 RES. IN HUM. ECOLOGY 12, 21 (2001).
217. Id. at 13.
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Each of these theories of cultural evolution posits a cultural struc-
ture that is "inheritable"-that is, the structure is passed from indivi-
dual to individual or from group to group. Culture consists of the
relationships, signs, meanings, and ideas humans have and create as
they interact-including legal regimes.218 While culture, like all ani-
mal behavior, has some genetic components, it is primarily of our
own creation. Clifford Geertz argues that culture is ultimately semio-
tic: "Believing . .. that man is an animal suspended in webs of signifi-
cance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search
of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."2 19 Culture passes
from generation to generation through imitation and learning, and so
even acquired variations-our intentional responses to environmental
factors-are continued across cultural generations. 220
Of course, the purpose here is not to defend Lamarckism as a
biological theory. Rather, my claim is that Lamarckian evolution-
particularly to the extent that it contemplates an intentional reaction
to environmental conditions-is a useful metaphor for explaining cul-
tural (and thus legal) evolution.
The usefulness of the Lamarckian analogy in cultural evolution is
precisely this capacity for a community-and external factors-to
affect the content of the institutional structure. It is not just the institu-
tional structure itself that can cause its own change (i.e., through "mu-
tation"). Were there some institutional genotype free from influence of
external environmental factors, we might be able to completely reject
the Lamarckian metaphor. But unless we assume that all human
behavior-including the specific content and effect of our laws-is
genetically coded, we shouldn't take that step.
But a complete theory of cultural evolution should combine both
Darwinian notions of random change and natural selection with the
Lamarckian idea of intentional response to external forces causing
durable change. The Lamarckian ideas contain an implicit reference
to natural selection as well (otherwise there would be no purpose
for the response). But one additional nuance is required. In cultural
evolution, the process of natural selection can and will include the
Lamarckian component. A community will experience the outcome
of either random or intentional change, consider whether it likes the
218. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTUREs (1973).
219. Id. at 5.
220. BOYD, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, supra note 212, at 8.
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outcome, and then act specifically and purposefully in response to that
outcome. In other words, a community can respond to a particular cul-
tural change by intentionally changing the culture.
These Darwinian and Lamarckian understandings of cultural evolu-
tion combine in what Daniel Bromley has described as "volitional
pragmatism."2 21 Bromley's theory includes two interrelated compo-
nents, as his title suggests-volition and pragmatism. But it will be
useful to begin by separating the two. First, Bromley argues that col-
lective action-including the creation of legal regimes-involves "[p]ro-
spective volition: the human will in action, looking to the future, de-
ciding how that future ought to unfold." 222 The second component, of
course, is "Pragmatism." As explained by Charles Sanders Peirce, the
essence of Pragmatism is that we can only know the meaning of some-
thing by experiencing its effects.2 23 Volitional pragmatism therefore
entails the imagining of plausible desired futures and the intentional
selection of specific alternatives-including specific legal regimes-
with the goal of attaining that desired future. 224 Human actors drive
cultural evolution by imagining the effects of various "ends," making
normative choices as to which constellation of effects is preferred, and
then identifying and implementing the institutional choices necessary
to achieve those ends. Those normative choices and institutional steps
are assessed or reassessed as their effects become apparent, and a new
plausible future is imagined.
How is this relevant to land use planning? If Pragmatism can claim
any access to better outcomes, it is in its insistence that proposals be
assessed based on the effects they might have. Identifying the "best"
future for a specific place, at a specific time, requires consideration
of all plausible futures, not only those offered or imagined by a politi-
cally or economically powerful subset of the community. We identify
what we want as we go about the process of determining what we can
have. If that process is curtailed, and the full range of "what we can
have" is not made available for our consideration, we have no way of
knowing whether our ultimate choice is the best available to us.
The ultimate problem with any idealized consensus-based approach
is that oppression is a basic fact of any democracy.2 2 s At its most fun-
221. BROMLEY, supra note 54.
222. Id. at 217.
223. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, PRAGMATISM: A READER 26,
36 (1997).
224. See BROMLEY, supra note 54.
225. RAWLS, supra note 142.
VOL. 44, No. 2 SPRING 2012392 THE URBAN LAWYER
NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
damental, the purpose of the planning law system is to determine how
a specific, identifiable parcel of land will be used. That decision makes
very specific and real assignments of rights and privileges, and in so
doing, necessarily takes away potential rights and privileges from
other actors. It also creates specific correlative duties in both the state
and other neighboring landowners. 2 2 6 Ultimately, a right is the capacity
to call upon the coercive power of the state to protect the right holder
against competing interests. Those decisions will be-in fact, must
be-made for any social structure to avoid a return to a Hobbesian
condition. An open and free democracy allows us to justify this oppres-
sion, but it does not avoid the oppression. The best system is the system
that most closely approximates consensus, understanding that in a so-
ciety of reasonable pluralism, consensus on the important questions is
impossible. Avoiding oppression caused by market failures, or even il-
liberal majorities, often requires state action to give a voice or power to
the oppressed.
But the argument is not that the government should be responsible
for promoting-or at least describing-specific outcomes because the
government "knows best." Rather, there are outcomes that the market
would not otherwise recommend or provide because no means exist to
ensure that the entity or individual providing the good can benefit from
providing the good. A particular alternative community design is of no
specific economic value to a single potential provider, even if it is a
public good of potentially great social value. When the public good is
a specific community vision, the likelihood that it will emerge from
the market is even less. Consequently, the creation of community vi-
sions is dominated by those ideas or components that do provide a spe-
cific economic benefit to a specific individual or group of individuals.
A Lamarckian approach does not require that communities accept
the "forced" vision, only that they have the opportunity to accept it.
This is the essence of selected Lamarckism. A Lamarckian approach
to community planning would provide the public goods that the cur-
rent system, because of economic and collective action constraints,
is unable to provide. A Lamarckian approach would place the burden
on the plan drafters, rather than on the "community," to identify the
best future for the community, or at least one or more initial "drafts"
of that best future. The public good-in the form of a vision otherwise
226. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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disadvantaged by the neoliberal hegemony-would then be available
to the community, to accept or reject as it chooses.
This policy proposal, which sounds a lot like imposing a particular
vision (or land-use regime) upon a community, might seem unwise,227
or at least distasteful, particularly for people who might not believe the
planning process is the appropriate place for planners to make norma-
tive judgments. 2 2 8 But before rejecting it, we must consider the alter-
native. Refusing to make an explicit normative statement through the
planning process only means that the normative statement is implicit.
It is no less real. As discussed above, a planning process that relies on
a marketplace of ideas will necessarily elevate those ideas that yield
specific and identifiable economic benefits to the individual partici-
pants. And because public goods provide no specific and identifiable
economic benefits to individual participants, those goods will not
emerge. Or if they do, they will not be championed, supported, nor ul-
timately adopted.
The choice to remain "neutral"-to allow the vision to emerge from
the community-is not in fact a neutral choice. It is also not a choice
that will necessarily yield the best outcomes. It is a specific choice to
prefer the status quo, to prefer outcomes that provide economic bene-
fits to the players that are motivated-by the prospect of those eco-
nomic benefits-to effectively participate in the process. It is a choice
to prefer the growth machine.229 This choice is made by both planners
as well as elected officials. The elected officials have their own bene-
fits to consider. Enriching the growth machine provides a simpler path
to reelection than does insisting on public goods to the potential detri-
ment of that growth machine.
This fact, of course, remains problematic, particularly given that the
public policy proposal offered here is primarily that local decision ma-
kers must insist on providing public goods, even in the face of a con-
stellation of private opposition. But the justification for the proposal in
the face of what unfortunately, and I believe inaccurately, seems to be
227. See Jonathan Thompson, Fearful of Agenda 21, an Alleged U.N. Plot, Acti-
vists Derail Land-Use Planning, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Feb. 6, 2012.
228. Not all planners seek to avoid normative judgments. In a classic essay, Paul
Davidoff argued for planners to actively participate in the normative discussion:
"the planner should do more than explicate the values underlying his prescriptions
for courses of action; he should affirm them; he should be an advocate for what he
deems proper." Paul Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. Am.
INST. PLANNERS 544 (1965).
229. See generally Molotch, City as a Growth Machine, supra note 15; see also
Molotch, Political Economy, supra note 34.
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the obvious political realities is that it will work. The reason sprawl
remains the predominant development pattern in the western United
States is not because we have investigated all of the options and cho-
sen the one that we prefer. It is the predominant development pattern
because it is the only development pattern we have allowed to exist. It
is all that we know. But when provided better options, we will choose
those options. Consider the following simplified example.
Originally motivated by farmers fearing the loss of agricultural
land, Oregon enacted its state-wide land-use regime in 1973.230
Often described as a state-wide planning law, or simply state-wide
planning, the 1973 Act was significant primarily for its substantive re-
quirements. Two in particular are relevant to this discussion. First, the
Act enabled the Department of Land Conservation and Development
to create statewide land-use goals with substantive provisions.2 3 1
They were, and are, articulated as planning goals, but that description
does not convey adequately the significance of the state-wide goals.
Contrary to the common understanding of the word "goal" as an as-
pirational potential end state, the Oregon legislature defined a goal,
for the purposes of the 1973 Act, as a "mandatory statewide land
use planning standards[.]" 2 32 Goal 14, for example, requires cities,
counties and regional governments to create urban growth boundaries:
"Urban growth boundaries shall be established and maintained by ci-
ties, counties and regional governments to provide land for urban de-
velopment needs and to identify and separate urban and urbanizable
land from rural land (emphasis added)."233
Of course, absent any mechanism to enforce that requirement, it
would be meaningless. But the second aspect of the 1973 Act relevant
to this discussion is the Act's requirement that all local land-use deci-
sions strictly comply with the statewide goals: "all comprehensive
plans and land use regulations adopted by a local government to
carry out those comprehensive plans and all plans, programs, rules
or regulations affecting land use adopted by a state agency or special
district shall be in compliance with the goals (emphasis added)."234
Oregon's state-wide planning law represented a very clear decision
230. See Carl Abbott & Deborah Howe, The Politics of Land-Use Law in Oregon:
Senate Bill 100, Twenty Years After, 94 OR. HIsT. QUART. 5 (1993).
231. S.B. 100, 1973 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995), available at www.oregon.gov/
LCD/docs/bills/sb100.pdf.
232. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.015 (2011).
233. OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING GoALs & GUIDELINES, http://www.lcd.state.or.
us/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf
234. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.250 (1983).
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to adopt a fundamental change in the state's approach to the regulation
of private lands.
But the Oregon Act was not a statement of a collective state-wide
vision. To the contrary, most of the state-defined geographically-
overwhelmingly opposed the Act. It was predominantly a Willamette
Valley Act,2 35 and enough legislators from the Willamette Valley sup-
ported the Act that it would have passed even with zero votes (rather
than nine out of forty possible) from the rest of the state.236 Dissatis-
faction with the Act threatened its existence on numerous occasions.
Its opponents finally succeeded in 2004 when Oregon voters approved
Measure 37.237
Measure 37, which largely repealed Oregon's 1973 law, at least
with respect to long-time landowners, might suggest that the forced
approach did not work. But it does just the opposite. The government,
against the wishes of the community, forced a particular vision that
was ultimately rejected. 238 And were Measure 37 that final act, that
might be a powerful story, challenged only by claims that Measure
37 was "sold" dishonestly to an unknowing public. 239 But it wasn't
the final act. Just three years later, Oregonians enacted Measure 49,
which repealed and replaced most of Measure 37's anti-planning pro-
visions. This is Pragmatism at work-identifying the value of a choice
by considering its consequences. Compared to the available alterna-
tives, as represented by Measure 37, Oregon preferred the original
"forced" approach.240
235. Oregon's large urban areas, university towns, and capital city-e.g., Portland,
Eugene, Corvallis, Salem-are all in the Willamette Valley.
236. See the following website for a history of the 1973 Act: LAND USE PLANNING,
THE OREGON ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entry/
view/landuse-planning/ (giving the history of the 1973 Act) (last visited Mar. 20,
2012).
237. For a discussion of Measure 37, its origins, and consequences, see Michael C.
Blumm & Erik Grafe, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon's Measure 37 and its
Implications, 85 DENv. U. L. REv. 279 (2007).
238. For one version of this story from a property rights advocate's perspective, see
David J. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land-Use Regulation and Ballot Measure 37: Newton's
Third Law at Work, 36 ENVrTL. L. 25 (2006).
239. See, e.g., Margaret H. Clune, Government Hardly Could Go On: Oregon's
Measure 37, Implications for Land Use Planning and A More Rational Means of Com-
pensation, 38 URB. LAW. 275 (2006); Blumm & Grafe, supra note 237, at 305-07.
240. Of course, the story is much more complicated than this statement suggests,
and Measure 49 was not a wholesale return to the 1973 regime. See Edward J. Sul-
livan & Jennifer M. Bragar, The Augean Stables: Measure 49 and the Herculean
Task of Correcting an Improvident Initiative Measure in Oregon, 46 WILLAMETrE
L. REv. 577, 579 (2010); Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments
Do: Evidence From the Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1330 (2009).
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VI. Conclusion
In the abstract, the socio-ecological structure of a place, including its
urban, suburban and exurban form, is determined in large part by a ta-
pestry of historical local, regional, and national land-use norms and
rules. Those land-use norms and rules-together forming the land-
use institution of a place-are themselves a product of an ongoing
conversation about the future of a place that is informed by the on-
the-ground consequences of previous land-use choices. This conversa-
tion is increasingly influenced by a neoliberal hegemony that reinforces
existing power structures and prefers specific narratives. Excluded from
the conversation are narratives that represent public goods-e.g., com-
munity plans that might most closely approach a consensus the commu-
nity could reach, if provided the opportunity to do so.
But the fact that the effects of previous choices lead to new choices
that create new effects suggests that an underused tool exists to pro-
mote community development that more closely reflects a pure public
good. If we can only understand the benefit of an approach by experi-
encing its benefits, the primary tool-if not the only effective tool-
for creating community-protective land-use institutions is the creation
of institutions that protect a community's social, cultural, and natural
resources in a manner that makes readily apparent to the affected com-
munity the benefits of those previous choices. Put another way, to
successfully implement community-protective land-use regimes, a
community must protect its valued resources and communicate the
benefits of that protection to the regulated community. It is the conse-
quences of doing that provide the reasons for doing, and the conse-
quences of doing are only known when they are available for us to
experience. 24 1 It is the effects of doing that provide the reasons for
doing.
By providing complete, specific alternatives at the beginning of the
planning process, a selected Lamarckism approach would enable com-
munities to more accurately imagine the potential consequences of
particular planning choices. As important, by reincorporating experts
from a variety of disciplines as both creators of and advocates for
particular planning alternatives, selected Lamarckism can identify
and champion public goods that would not otherwise emerge in a
neoliberal-dominated collaborative process. Notwithstanding the use
241. For an alternative perspective, see, e.g., David M. Messick, Alternative Logics
for Decision Making in Social Settings, 39 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11 (1999).
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of rational technocrats to develop the initial alternatives, this approach
is potentially more inclusive than collaborative processes that yield
vague outcomes co-opted by growth-oriented interests.
Human landscapes are law realized. And law should be vision for-
malized. If planners want communities to enact good visions, planners
must create good visions for communities to enact.
